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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, congressional proposals for patent reform,'
combined with several high profile Supreme Court decisions, 2 have sparked
numerous discussions of the current state of the United States patent laws.3
Additionally, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 4 has encouraged discussion of the success
achieved in bringing uniformity to the field of patent law.5 Much of the
J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2009; M.B.A.,
Boston College, 2004; M. Eng. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, 2000; B.S.
Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, 1999. I would like to thank my family, and
especially my parents, for their continuous support and for providing me the foundation
that has enabled me to succeed in law school.
I See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, State of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (June 28, 2007) (highlighting aspects of patent reform proposals currently
pending).
2 During the 2006 and 2007 terms, the Supreme Court decided four highly
influential patent cases. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388 (2006).
3 In the United States, all patent law is federal and enacted pursuant to the Patent
Clause in the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall
have Power ... [T]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. . ").
4 See Michel, supra note 1 (describing the state of the Federal Circuit twenty-five
years after its creation).
5 The Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from district court decisions based on civil actions relating to patents. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2008). S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) ("The creation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity" and "will increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law."); H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981)
("[T]he central purpose [of the Federal Courts Improvement Act] is to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the
administration of the patent law."). See also Judge Pauline Newman, Origins of the
Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 541, 542 (2002) (noting one of
the reasons cited for why Congress established the court was because it "felt that most
judges didn't understand the patent system and how it worked");
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recent discussion, however, has focused upon issues internal to the United
States patent system.6
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. AT& T
Corp.,7 however, is likely to bring the issue of territoriality to the forefront of
many patent law debates. 8 One debate that has already been influenced by
the Microsoft decision relates to the scope of "offers to sell" infringement
liability.9 The issue that both courts and commentators have grappled with is
whether an offer made in the United States to sell a patented invention in a
foreign country constitutes an act of infringement. The most recent district
court to decide this question relied upon the territoriality principles espoused
by the Supreme Court in Microsoft to conclude that a sale must be
contemplated within the United States before an offer can be found to
infringe.' 0 However, the Federal Circuit has never squarely addressed this
issue, and previous district courts to confront the question are divided.
Clearly the issue remains unsettled."
6 See e.g, U.S. GOv. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, HIRING EFFORTs ARE
NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG (2007) (highlighting
backlog of patent applications and resulting delays in reviewing patent applications); see
also David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223 (2008) (reviewing
impact of Federal Circuit reversal on district judges); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (reviewing inability of Patent Office and courts
to make rational obviousness determinations); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance,
and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 (1995) (reviewing relationship between Patent
Office and the Federal Circuit).
7 550 U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
8 Territoriality is the principle that United States laws only apply within the United
States. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915)
("The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its
territories (Rev. Stat. § 4884, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9428), and infringement of this right
cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country."); Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856) (noting that patent law "is domestic in its character, and
necessarily confined within the limits of the United States"). See also Jane C. Ginsburg,
Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
587, 588 (1997) (defining extraterritoriality as "the application of one country's laws to
events occurring outside that country's borders").
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2007) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefor (sic), infringes the patent.") (emphasis added).
10 See infra Part IV.C.
11 See, e.g., Denise W. DeFranco & Adrienne N. Smith, Technology and the Global
Economy: Progress Challenges the Federal Circuit to Define the Extraterritorial Scope
of U.S. Patent Law, 34 ALPLA Q.J. 373, 397 (2006) (recognizing this issue as unsettled);
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The question of whether a domestic offer to sell a patented invention in a
foreign country may constitute patent infringement implicates several
significant policies. 12 Some courts conclude that applying United States
patent laws to offers contemplating foreign sales violates the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 13 At the same time, other courts have found
applying "offers to sell" infringement in these circumstances necessary to
protect the valid interests of patent holders in excluding offers within the
United States. 14 The academic commentary on this issue is similarly divided
on the importance of the territoriality presumption. 15
The conflict between patent holders desiring to assert their exclusive
rights and competitors, i.e. potential infringers, seeking to limit those rights is
likely to increase as markets become increasingly global. 16 Patentees lacking
patent protection in a foreign country may seek to maximize the
extraterritorial application of exclusive rights under their United States
patent. 17 Historically, however, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the "Threat of a Sale ": Assessing Patent Infringement
for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and
Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 751, 754 n. 19 (2003) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale].
12 Most commentary on "offers to sell" infringement, however, has focused upon the
scope of activity that may be considered an "offer." See, e.g., Larry S. Zelson, Comment,
The Illusion of "Offer to Sell" Patent Infringement: When an Offer is an Offer But Is Not
an Offer, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1283 (2006).
13 See infra Part IV.B.
14 See infra Part IV.A.
15 Compare Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for
Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 701,
732 (2004) [hereinafter Holbrook, Territoriality] (noting "[c]ommentators have argued
for limiting the reach of offers to sell because of the hesitancy to apply U.S. patent law
extraterritorially"), with Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in
Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 608 (1997)
(noting that in a global economy territoriality is an "inadequate guide" for interpreting the
patent infringement statute).
16 See Robert W. Pierson, Jr., Note, Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law: Has
the Federal Circuit Gone Too Far, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 651,
682 (2007) ("As the global economy spreads and multinational companies continue to
merge, borders become irrelevant, which will spur disputes over territorial subject matter
for U.S. patent law.").
17 The territorial nature of patent protection increases the costs of securing patent
protection in a global market. See Chisum, supra note 15, at 618 ("The cumulative costs
of registering and maintaining trademarks and patents internationally threaten to exclude
small, independent enterprises, which may be unable to obtain funding and to compete in
product and service markets that are heavily dependent upon intellectual property
protection.").
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permit any expansion of the patentee's exclusive rights. 18 One commentator
attributes this reluctance to the Court's "historical antipathy towards
patents."'19 In contrast to the Supreme Court, however, Congress has been
more accommodating of the patentee's interests. 20 "The evolution of the
forms of infringement suggests that Congress has an expansive view of what
constitutes infringement and is interested in increasing the strength and scope
of U.S. patents." 21 Recently Congress has reaffirmed its interest in
strengthening intellectual property rights, particularly in the international
context.22 However, the extent of Congress's willingness to expand the scope
of patent protection does have limits.23 The competing policies and diverse
perspectives that influence the development of patent law would confirm
there is no simple answer to whether an offer made in the United States for a
sale contemplated in a foreign country constitutes patent infringement.
However, this question must be answered and the proper scope of "offers to
sell" infringement defined in order to provide both patentees and competitors
the benefits of clearly demarcated property rights. 24
Absent congressional action to clarify the scope of "offers to sell"
infringement liability, the Federal Circuit and perhaps even the Supreme
Court will eventually be faced with the difficult task of deciding this issue,
18 See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
19 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 732. This antipathy is reflected in the
four Supreme Court cases recently decided-all of which ruled against the patent holder.
See supra note 2.
20 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 754.
21 Id. For example, Congress amended the patent statute to include exporting
components of a patented invention as a form of infringement effectively overruling the
Supreme Court's contrary holding in Deepsouth. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(0.
22 Recently introduced legislation would enhance the civil and criminal penalties for
copyright and trademark infringement. See, e.g., H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007).
23 Various patent reform proposals would restrict the availability of certain types of
patents. See Suzanne Barlyn, Bills Challenge Tax Strategy Patents: High-Net-Worth
Clients Could Face License Fees and Lawsuits for Violations, On Wall Street, Feb. 1,
2008. See also the Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145 110th Cong., and S. 681 110th
Cong. (2007), which would halt the granting of tax strategy patents by the USPTO. The
proposed reforms embody concerns about the societal value of business method patents
that have been expressed in the media and even by the Supreme Court. See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
vagueness and suspect validity of business method patents).
24 See generally William S. Nabors, A Reasonable Apprehension of Lawsuit: A
Restrictive Threshold for Federal Court Jurisdiction in Patent Declaratory Judgments, 7
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2006) (noting that the risk of potential patent
infringement liability is a significant injury caused by uncertainty about the scope of
patent rights).
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choosing between the competing policies and justifications offered in support
of the proposed constructions. This Note will highlight another lens through
which courts might look in making this complex and important decision.
This Note will begin by detailing the prior development of this issue. In
Part II, the origin of "offers to sell" infringement will be explored along with
the limited legislative history surrounding its enactment.25 Part III will then
examine the evolution through the Federal Circuit, including the underlying
purpose attributed to this form of infringement.26 The leading decision
applying "offers to sell" infringement will be examined and the conflict
between the majority and concurring opinions explored.27 Part IV will
examine the competing views developed by the district courts and conclude
by examining the most recent district court decision that relied upon
Microsoft.2 8 After the development of this question through the lower courts
is complete, Part V will examine the territoriality principles espoused in
Microsoft, the argument applying those principles, and conclude that
territoriality alone provides an insufficient basis for determining the proper
scope of "offers to sell" infringement. 29 Finally, Part VI will summarize the
patentee's economic interests in "offering to sell" a patented invention and
argue that these economic interests provide a coherent explanation for
construing "offers to sell" to apply to an offer made in the United States,
regardless of the location of the contemplated sale. 30
II. ORIGIN OF "OFFER TO SELL" INFRINGEMENT
Prior to 1994, a party could infringe a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
only by making, using, or selling the patented invention.31 In 1994, however,
the international community took a major step forward in the process of
harmonizing international intellectual property laws, and patent laws
specifically. 32 The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations for
revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) resulted in
the establishment of the World Trade Organization and adoption of the
25 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 See infra Part V.
30 See infra Part VI.
31 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
32 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 688 (2002) (noting that TRIPS "requires signatory nations to conform
their patent laws to a uniform framework of international standards").
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leading international treaty on intellectual property-the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 33
For the first time in the history of international intellectual property
treaties,34 the TRIPS Agreement established minimum exclusive rights that
all member countries would provide to patent owners. 35 To comply with
these new obligations, Congress amended § 271(a), (c), (e), and (f) to add
two new forms of patent infringement: offering to sell and importing a
patented invention.36 The adoption of these changes, however, occurred with
a notable lack of discussion in Congress. 37 Rather than articulate the policy
rationale for establishing these new forms of infringement, the scant
legislative history merely identifies the changes being made.38 These changes
33 The World Trade Organization's website provides detailed background
information on GATT, the Uruguay Round negotiations, TRIPS, and the formation of the
WTO. See generally World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 1,
2009).
34 Prior to TRIPS, neither of the two international patent law treaties of which the
United States was a member defined minimum standards for exclusive rights. See Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property amended Sept. 28 1979, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 ; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
1160 U.N.T.S. 231. Similarly, the European Patent Convention also lacks minimum
standards analogous to those provided in the TRIPS Agreement. See Convention on the
Grant of European Patents, 5 Oct. 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
35 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 28, Apr.
15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]:
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the
subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the
owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes that product.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533, 108 Stat. at 4990
(1994) (implementing obligations of the TRIPS Agreement) [hereinafter URAA]. The
amended statute became effective January 1, 1996.
37 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 763 ("These changes were made
with little discussion and, as such, there is no legislative history to inform the metes and
bounds of this new form of infringement.").
38 See S. REP. No. 103-412 (1994) ("Title V [of the URAA] implements the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP).... The
patent subtitle ... amends the definition of infringing activity to include offers for sale
and importation of a patented good...."); H.R. REP. No. 103-826(1) (1994).
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thus resulted in the current version of § 271(a), 39 which is the primary focus
of this Note.40
In addition to the changes to § 271(a), the 1994 amendments also added
§ 271(i) to the infringement statute, providing a partial clarification of "offer
for sale."41 Section 271(i) provides, "[a]s used in this section, an 'offer for
sale' or an 'offer to sell' by a person other than the patentee, or any designee
of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur before the expiration of
the term of the patent. '42 Much like § 271(a), Congress has provided no
guidance on the meaning or purpose of this statute.43 A literal reading of this
provision suggests that to have an infringing offer for sale, the sale
contemplated by the offer must be intended to occur before the expiration of
the term of the patent.44 Such a construction appears to be consistent with
confining the patentee's exclusive rights to the twenty-year term provided by
statute.45 However, the seemingly temporal limitation imposed by § 271(i)
has been used to justify limiting "offer to sell" infringement liability to only
those sales contemplated to occur within the United States.46 While the
origin of "offer to sell" infringement liability is easily traced back to the
Uruguay Round Agreements, the lack of legislative history or other
interpretive aids leaves the courts and potential litigants with little guidance.
39 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2007) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of
the patent therefor (sic), infringes the patent.").
40 Although the "offers to sell" language was added to multiple parts of § 271, this
Note will focus on § 271(a) as a proxy for examining the competing policies underlying
"offer for sale" infringement.
41 URAA, supra note 36, at § 533(a)(5).
42 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2007).
43 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 763 n.8 1.
44 Id. (noting that "[i]f a patentee must wait and see if the infringing sale is
consummated during the patent term, then the impact of the addition of 'offers to sell' in
§ 27 1(a) would be minimal").
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (establishing twenty-year patent term measured
from the date of filing). In this context, section § 271(i) may be viewed as a corollary to
the public use and on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The Federal Circuit has noted, "[o]ne
of the primary purposes of section 102(b) is to preclude commercial exploitation of an
invention which has the effect of expanding the period of exclusive rights granted by the
statute." Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Similarly, section 271(i) precludes a patentee from achieving a de facto
extension of the exclusive rights beyond the statutory term by limiting infringing offers to
only those that contemplate a sale within the twenty-year period of exclusivity.
46 See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Newman, J., concurring in the judgment), discussed infra Part Ill.B.
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III. EVOLUTION OF "OFFER FOR SALE" INFRINGEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
As a relatively recent addition to a patentee's exclusive rights, the
Federal Circuit has had remarkably few opportunities to shape the contours
of "offer for sale" infringement. In this section, the development of the
Federal Circuit's "offer for sale" jurisprudence is reviewed from the initial
focus on establishing personal jurisdiction to the later cases addressing the
scope of infringing activity. The central policy arguments advanced by the
court are highlighted, because with limited controlling precedent, district
courts often return to these underlying policies when interpreting and
applying "offer for sale" infringement in specific cases. 47
A. Initial Steps: Defining the Purpose
The Federal Circuit first discussed the policies underlying the "offers to
sell" prong of § 271(a) in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction
over alleged infringers. 48 Applying the Federal Circuit's test for personal
jurisdiction, the court analyzed whether a claim for patent infringement arose
out of or related to the defendant's actions directed towards the forum state.49
The defendant's primary action, which the plaintiff-patentee alleged
constituted infringement, was sending price quotation letters to residents in
California. 50 Thus, the central issue was whether the defendant's price
quotation letters could constitute an offer to sell. Recognizing this case
presented an issue of first impression, the court held that federal rather than
state law controlled the definition of the "offer;"' 51 however, in spite of
similar language, the court declined to import the authority construing the
on-sale bar of § 102(b). 52
47 See infra Part IV.
48 See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
49 Id. at 1378-79. See also Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (establishing Federal Circuit's three-part personal jurisdiction test).
50 Aarotech, 160 F.3d at 1378.
51 Id. at 1379 ("We have rejected previous attempts to shape our personal
jurisdiction law through state common law definitions of federal statutory terms .... The
statutory character of the 'offer to sell' requires us to 'look back to federal law on the
conceptualization' of the 'offer to sell' itself.") (quoting N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. Am.
Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
52 The court noted the distinguishable polices underlying § 102(b):
[Tihe concern that patentees will commercialize their inventions while deferring the
beginning of the statutory patent term, encouraging prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions to the public, discouraging the removal of inventions from
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The Federal Circuit concluded that price quotations letters containing "a
description of the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it
can be purchased" could be regarded as offers to sell.53 In reaching this
conclusion the court noted, "[o]ne of the purposes of adding 'offer[] to sell'
to § 271(a) was to prevent exactly the type of activity [the alleged infringer]
has engaged in, i.e. generating interest in a potentially infringing product to
the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee. '54 In the absence of
legislative history,55 this statement of purpose has been widely adopted by
numerous Federal Circuit and district court opinions. 56 The importance of
commercial detriment is further illustrated by the Federal Circuit's
subsequent holding that an "offer to donate" does not constitute patent
infringement. 57 By emphasizing the economic impact on the patentee, the
court ensured that the stated purpose of "offer to sell" infringement was
consistent with the generally accepted purpose of granting a patentee
exclusive rights-"to allow the patentee to recoup the costs of developing the
invention." 58
the public domain when the public has come to rely on their ready availability, and
giving investors a reasonable period to discern the potential value of an invention.
Id. at 1379 n.4 (citing Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
However, this distinction drawn by the Federal Circuit between the policies supporting
§ 102(b) and § 271 has been called into question. See, e.g., Holbrook, Threat of a Sale,
supra note 11, at 778.
The value that the patentee extracts from the patent pre-term is the same value that
an infringer inappropriately extracts during the patent term-the commercial value
of the invention. Consequently, the policies identified by the Federal Circuit are an
improper basis upon which to justify treating "offers to sell" and the "on-sale bar"
differently.
Id.
53 Aarotech, 160 F.3d at 1379.
54 Id. (alteration in original) ("such a construction harmonizes with the broad
definition of 'offer to sell' provided in § 271(i)").
55 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420
F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, 256 F. Supp. 2d
228 (D. Del. 2003).
57 See HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("to
be an offer to sell for purposes of section 271 (a) the alleged offer must include more than
a mere invitation to accept a gift.., the offer [must] include.., the hallmarks of a
potential commercial transaction.").
58 Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 778.
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B. Rotec: The Leading Case and the Complicating Concurrence
The leading Federal Circuit decision addressing "offer for sale"
infringement liability is Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.59 The
Rotec decision is significant not only because it represents the first Federal
Circuit decision addressing the merits of "offer for sale" infringement, 60 but
also because of the vigorous disagreement between the panel majority and
the concurring opinion. Although the Rotec court did not reach the question
of whether an offer made in the United States to sell a patented invention in a
foreign country constitutes infringement under § 271(a), the facts of Rotec
are typical of the cases that raise this issue.
In Rotec, the plaintiff-patentee alleged the defendants committed patent
infringement by offering to sell an infringing system to the People's Republic
of China (PRC). 61 It was undisputed that the actual sale would take place in
China and that the plaintiff's patent covered the system to be sold by the
defendants. 62 The only disputed issue was whether an "offer to sell" was
made in the United States.63 After a thorough review of the origin of "offer
for sale" infringement, the limited legislative history, and prior case law,64
the court concluded that the plaintiffs evidence could not support finding an
offer was made in the United States. 65
The Rotec court's analysis has provided significant guidance on both the
definition and application of "offer for sale" infringement. The court began
its analysis by articulating the strong territoriality principle of United States
59 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
60 Previous cases, such as 3D Systems, had only addressed "offer to sell"
infringement in the context of personal jurisdiction. See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra
note 15, at 724 (recognizing Rotee as the first case to address the merits of "offer for
sale" infringement).
61 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1249. The PRC had solicited bid proposals for concrete
delivery systems to be used in the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze river. Id.
The plaintiff was a United States company and manufacturer of such concrete delivery
systems. Id. at 1248. The defendants consisted of both United States and foreign
companies and independent contractors that prepared and submitted a bid in response to
the PRC's solicitation. Id. at 1249.
62 Id. at 1249-51.
63 Id. at 1250 ("Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that
Rotec could not prove that Defendants committed the alleged act of infringement-the
offer to sell-within the United States.").
64Id. at 1251-55.
65 Id. at 1257. The fact that the majority's analysis focused upon evidence of an
offer to sell being made in the United States, rather than on the location of the
contemplated sale, suggests that if the evidence had supported finding an offer to sell
made in the United States, the patent would have been infringed under § 27 1(a). See id. at
1258 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
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patent law: "The right conferred by a patent under [United States] law is
confined to the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right
cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country. ' 66 Notably,
the court did not use this principle to find that a domestic offer for a foreign
sale could not constitute infringement, but rather, the court applied the
territoriality principle to limit the scope of the defendants' activities that
would be considered. 67 Only actions within the United States could be used
to determine whether the defendants made an infringing "offer for sale." 68
The Rotec court reaffirmed the purpose of "offer for sale" infringement
liability articulated in 3D Systems.69 The court noted that by adding "offers to
sell" to the infringement statute "Congress sought to strengthen the
protections afforded" to patentees. 70 "The question remains, however, as to
how much strength Congress wished to add to the parameters of a patent
grant."'7 ' The court focused on what activities would cause "commercial
detriment" to the patentee, and concluded that communication with a third
party was required. 72 Applying this standard, the court found that the
plaintiff's evidence did not show the defendants "generat[ed] interest in a
potentially infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful
patentee." 73 The court also noted that requiring third-party communication
66 Id. at 1251 (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,
650 (1915)).
67 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1251 ("[flt is... undisputed that many of these activities took
place outside the United States, in China and elsewhere. These extraterritorial activities
however, are irrelevant to the case before us.").
68 Id. ("[W]e must establish whether Defendants' activities in the United States...
are sufficient to establish an 'offer for sale . .
69 Id. at 1255.
70 Id. at 1252 (reviewing legislative history).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1255 ("In the absence of communication with a third party, it is difficult to
imagine any commercial detriment of the rightful patentee taking place.").
73 Id. (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)). The plaintiff-patentee offered evidence that:
(1) the offering parties met nine times in the United States about supplying a
conveyor system for the Three Gorges Dam Project; (2) [the offering parties]
designed and priced the contemplated system in the United States; and (3) the
written offer identified [the offering party] as the supplier for the concrete system,
and confirmed that [the offering party] had provided all relevant technical and
financial documents.
Id. The critical issue, however, was that "[n]one of this evidence... establish[ed] any
communication by Defendants with any third party." Id.
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maintains a proper balance between the interests of the patentee and the
interests of the public. 74
Finally, Rotec narrowed the definition of "offer to sell" from the broad
construction adopted in 3D Systems. 75 Reviewing the intervening Supreme
Court decision in Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc.,76 the Rotec court found the
analysis of the on-sale bar to be sufficiently analogous to conclude that "an
offer for sale ... requires no more than a commercial offer for sale" as
defined by "the norms of traditional contractual analysis. ' 77 Additionally, in
spite of the declared purpose of the TRIPS Agreement to harmonize
international patent law, 78 the Rotec court declined to adopt the expansive
definition of "offer to sell" employed in the United Kingdom. 79 The Federal
Circuit's narrow interpretation of "offer to sell" requiring a "formal
commercial offer for sale" is thus the framework within which "offer to sale"
infringement is currently analyzed. 80
Even though the Rotec majority did not address the question of whether a
domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale would constitute an act of
infringement, Judge Newman, concurring only in the judgment, tackled this
question directly. "[T]he majority opinion necessarily accepts the critical
premise that an 'offer to sell' made in the United States can constitute patent
infringement even when the contemplated sale could not infringe the patent. I
do not believe that 35 U.S.C. § 271 is correctly so interpreted."'81 Under this
74 See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255. The court observed that many activities "could also
lead to 'generating interest.., to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee"' but
are not prohibited by the patent statute. Id. (quoting 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 n.4).
Examples of such activities that do not involve third-party communication are: "(1)
studying a patent in anticipation of its expiration; (2) estimating the cost of producing a
disclosed invention before the date of expiration; [and] (3) reviewing a patent to ascertain
whether the claims read on a product currently in development." Id.
75 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55.
76 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (holding a "product must be the subject of a commercial
offer for sale" to trigger the on-sale bar of § 102(b)).
77 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55. The court found the analysis consistent, in spite of
the different policy justifications for § 102(b) and § 271(a). Id. at 1255 n.3.
78 See Lisa B. Martin & Susan L. Amster, International Intellectual Property
Protections in the New GATTAccord, 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 9, 9 (1994).
79 See Gerber Garment Tech. Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd., [1995] 13 R.P.C. 383, 411-12
(United Kingdom Patents Court) (holding mere advertising activities could infringe, even
if the activities do not meet the common law definition of offer, because a patentee is
harmed by an advertisement for a sale set to take place during the term of the patent).
80 District courts have struggled to apply this "commercial offer" standard in the
context of federal common law. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 781-84
(concluding that a broader commercialization standard may lead to greater certainty in
application of the patent laws).
81 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
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view, there could be no "offer to sell" infringement on the facts in Rotec
because the contemplated sale was to occur in China---outside the
jurisdiction of the United States patent laws. 82
The central principle underlying Judge Newman's interpretation is that
"an offer to sell a device or system whose actual sale cannot infringe a
United States patent is not an infringing act under § 271." 83 Judge Newman
supports this contention by arguing that "[t]he purpose of § 271(a) was to
permit a patentee to act against threatened infringing sale by establishing a
cause of action before actual sale occurred."' 84 This view of the purpose of
"offer for sale" infringement liability is notably different than the purpose
articulated in 3D Systems and adopted by the Rotec majority.85
Judge Newman draws support for this position from the language of
§ 27 1(i) which defines an "offer for sale" as "that in which the sale will occur
before the expiration of the term of the patent."'86 From this limiting
definition, Judge Newman infers: "By requiring that the actual sale of the
thing offered will occur before the patent expires, the statute makes clear that
the sale must be one that will infringe the patent."'87 Thus, the principle
benefit provided by the addition of "offer for sale" infringement is that "the
patentee need not await an actual sale, and may seek injunctive relief and any
damages that may have accrued due to the offer." 88
Because the "offer to sell" form of infringement arose in the context of
harmonizing international patent law, 89 Judge Newman looked to the
interpretation of an analogous provision in foreign patent law. 90 Interpreting
82 Id. at 1258-59; see also supra note 8 (defining the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
83 Id. at 1259. This contention appears to be an original interpretation advanced by
Judge Newman as no authority is cited for this critical proposition.
84 Id.
85 The purpose stated in 3D Systems would suggest a more expansive view of the
patentee's exclusive rights including preventing other parties from generating interest in a
potentially infringing product; whereas, the purpose articulated by Judge Newman would
suggest that "offer to sell" merely gives the patentee the ability to enforce an existing
right-to exclude others from selling the patented product-at an earlier time.
86 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1259 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 271(i)).
87 Id.; see also Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and
Infringement After GATT/TRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 351-52 (Summer/Fall 1994)
(noting an offer for sale will infringe only if the contemplated sale will occur during the
term of the patent).
88 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1260.
89 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
90 Using foreign law to interpret domestic statutes is particularly appropriate when
the domestic statute in question was enacted pursuant to an international treaty designed
to harmonize the laws of the signatory countries. See Edward Lee, The New Canon:
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the equivalent of "offers to sell," 9 1 the United Kingdom patent court
concluded "that the statutory 'offers to dispose of' the patented product must
be read as meaning, 'offers in the United Kingdom to dispose of the product
in the United Kingdom.' 92
Thus while the Rotec majority and concurrence disagree as to whether a
domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale constitutes patent infringement
under § 271(a), the underlying dispute may have been a more fundamental
disagreement over the purpose of offer for sale infringement and the extent to
which the addition of offer for sale infringement liability should expand the
exclusive rights of patentees.
C. Latest Federal Circuit Guidance
While the Rotec majority and concurring opinions have both received
substantial consideration by district courts, 93 the most recent case with
similar facts was decided consistent with the Rotec majority.94 In MEMC, the
plaintiff-patentee alleged activity within the United States constituted an
infringing offer for sale, and also alleged actual infringing sales. 95 The
Federal Circuit analyzed both of these claims and concluded that neither an
infringing offer for sale nor an actual sale occurred within the United
States. 96 Consistent with the Rotec requirement of a commercial offer for
sale, the court noted that "the defendant must communicate a manifestation
of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to the bargain is invited and will conclude it. ' 97
Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46
HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 18-19 (2005).
91 While the United States uses the term "offer to sell," the equivalent provision in
the United Kingdom patent code is "offers to dispose of." See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1259.92 Id. (citing Kalman v. PCL Packaging (UK) Ltd., [1982] F.S.R. 406 (U.K.)).
93 See infra Part IV.
94 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In a nonprecedential opinion between Rotec and MEMC, the
Federal Circuit apparently left open the possibility that "activities in the United States,
while allegedly aimed at securing international sales, [may give] rise to an offer for sale
in the United States under section 271(a))." Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 65 F. App'x 293, 296
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (nonprecedential) (vacating summary judgment in favor of accused
infringer).
95 MEMC, 420 F.3d at 1372.
96Id. at 1375-77 (recognizing that "the reach of section 271(a) is limited to
infringing activities that occur within the United States").
97 Id. at 1376 (quoting Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Applying this standard, no relevant evidence of an offer to sell was found in
the defendant's domestic activities.98
The court's willingness to analyze whether an offer for sale was made is
notable in light of the fact that the court found "any sale of the [infringing
product]... occurred in Japan where all of the essential activities took
place." 99 Once the court concluded that the actual sale took place in Japan,
under the Rotec concurrence analysis, no infringing offer for sale could have
been found even if the offer had occurred in the United States.1 00 By
inquiring into whether an offer for sale was made in the United States, the
MEMC court must have accepted the premise that an "offer to sell" made in
the United States contemplating a sale outside the United States could
infringe under § 271(a).10 1
IV. CONFUSION IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
The limited Federal Circuit guidance on "offer for sale" infringement
liability 10 2 has led to conflicting decisions in the district courts, 103
undermining the purpose for which the Federal Circuit was created. 104
98 MEMC, 420 F.3d at 1376. The court specifically noted that there was "no
evidence of negotiations occurring in the United States" and that an e-mail containing a
description of the allegedly infringing product but not containing price terms could not be
construed as an offer to sell. Id.
99 Id. at 1377 (emphasis in original). The plaintiff presented no evidence to counter
the undisputed fact that activity related to the sales process was conducted outside of the
United States. Id.
100 See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
101 See MEMC, 420 F.3d at 1377. Curiously, despite the fact that Judge Newman
was on the MEMC panel, the MEMC opinion did not address the arguments raised in the
Rotec concurrence. Further, Judge Newman joined the MEMC opinion in full, perhaps
suggesting that the Federal Circuit will follow the Rotec majority on this issue.
102 See Part III, supra (reviewing principle Federal Circuit decisions).
103 See Nicholas Oros, Infringement Twice Removed: Inducement of Patent
Infringement for Overseas Manufacture of Infringing Products Imported by Another, 10
Comp. L. REV. & TECH. J. 163, 182 (2006) (recognizing that a "spirited debate has
developed in the courts"). The debate, however, is confined to the issue of an offer for
contemplated foreign sales; it is undisputed that an offer made in the United States to sell
a patented invention within the United States constitutes patent infringement. See, e.g.,
Fellowes, Inc. v. Michilin Prosperity Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577-83 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(finding foreign manufacturer made offers in the United States to sell in the United States
thereby infringing the United States patent).
104 See supra note 5 (noting objective of the Federal Circuit was to bring uniformity
to patent law jurisprudence). Disagreement over infringement liability for pre-sale
activity is, however, not a new phenomenon and existed well before the formation of the
Federal Circuit. Compare Scaramucci v. FMC Corp., 258 F. Supp. 598, 601 (W.D. Okla.
1966) (concluding that "successful solicitations of sales" should constitute infringement),
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Further, given the relatively few cases directly addressing domestic offers
contemplating foreign sales, the district courts have had few opportunities to
persuade each other and reach consensus. 105 As such, the district courts apply
the same Federal Circuit precedents but reach markedly different
conclusions.
A. Cases Supporting "Offer to Sell" Infringement Predicated on
Contemplated Foreign Sales
The first district court decision adopting the position that offers made in
the United States to sell a patented invention in a foreign country may
constitute infringement under §271(a) was Halmar Robicon Group v.
Toshiba International Corp. 106 On cross motions for summary judgment, the
parties asked the court to decide whether the defendant had infringed the
plaintiff's patent by offering to sell a product to customers located in Canada
and Houston, Texas. 10 7 The court dismissed the plaintiffs motion as
premature, but addressed the merits of the defendant's motion.108 With
respect to the Canadian customer, the court found the defendant's offer was
made in the United States. 10 9 By denying summary judgment even though
with Andco Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. Niagara Envtl. Assocs., Inc. 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
652, 654-55 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding advertising and soliciting orders for allegedly
infringing device does not constitute direct infringement), and Welding Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co., 169 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (same).
105 The few reported "offer for sale" cases may suggest this form of infringement
liability is of limited utility to patentees who may have difficulty both detecting offers
and establishing that an offer was for a patented invention. Further, many offers may
result in actual domestic sales providing an alternative and more well-defined theory for
infringement litigation.
106 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
107 Id. at 1501-02. The court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants
"with respect to all 'offers and sales of products manufactured and delivered entirely
outside the United States,' other than the offers of sale made by [the defendant] to
Chevron [of Canada] and the City of Houston." Id. at 1505.
108 Id. at 1503. The plaintiff's motion required determining whether the patent
claims read on the allegedly infringing product, but the court had not yet construed the
patent claims. Id. at 1502-03. See also Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15
F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The law is well established that the determination
whether a claim has been infringed requires a two-step analysis. First, the claim must be
properly construed to determine its scope and meaning. Second, the claim as properly
construed must be compared to the accused device or process."); accord Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
10 9 Halmar, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1504. The critical fact was that the defendant sent a
letter from Houston, Texas to the customer in Calgary, Alberta (Canada) containing a
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the sale took place in Canada, 110 the court must have determined that a
domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale could constitute infringement."'I
Another district court noted that "certain actions taken within the United
States [can] lead to liability for patent infringement for an infringing product
otherwise made, used, or sold outside of the United States."' 1 2 While
recognizing the territorial nature of patent rights, the court supported its
position by recognizing the purpose of "offer for sale" infringement set forth
in 3D Systems, and identified three forms of patent infringement that may be
predicated on domestic action leading to foreign sales. 113 The analysis in
Fieldturf, however, is clearly dicta. In spite of significant domestic
activity,"14 the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant
extended "the requisite commercial offer." 1 5 Moreover, the court found that
the defendant carefully tailored its activities to avoid making offers within
the United States. 116 Lacking the predicate domestic act of making the offer,
description of the product and a price at which it could be purchased. Id.; see also 3D
Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
110 By the defendant's own admission, "the product ultimately sold was made in
Japan, partially assembled in Canada and never entered the United States. Additionally,
the order issued by [the customer] in response to [the defendant's] offer shows that
F.O.B. point for the [product] was Calgary." Halmar, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1503.
111 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 739.
112 Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 708, 731
(E.D. Ky. 2002), vacated and remanded, 357 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2004). On appeal, the
Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on the patent, and therefore
did not reach the merits of the district court's analysis. Id. at 1269.
113 Fieldturf 235 F. Supp. 2d at 731. The types of infringement based on a predicate
domestic act are:
(I) an offer to sell made in the United States [violating § 271(a)], (2) ... suppli[ng]
or caus[ing] to be supplied in or from the United States a substantial portion of the
components of the patented invention [violating § 27 1(f)(1)], or (3)... suppli[ng] or
caus[ing] to be supplied in or from the United States a component of the patented
invention that is especially made or adopted for use in the invention and is not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for non-infringing use [violating
§ 271 (f)(2)].
Id.
114 The alleged activity consisted of contacting customers, receiving proposals,
sending quotations, making shipping and customs arrangements, instructing on delivery
and installation, shipping products, accepting payment, and meeting with customers. Id.
at 731-32.
115 Id. at 732; see also Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
l 6 Fieldturf 235 F. Supp. 2d at 732. ("This court finds that [the defendant's]
testimony describes a system of deflecting inquiries from abroad to representatives
outside of the United States, a practice that hardly reveals the requisite content
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the location of the contemplated sale became immaterial to the court's
holding.
The district court's decision in Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. 117 appears to be the first case in which a court has explicitly held that an
offer made in the United States for a contemplated foreign sale would
constitute infringement. 18 In a prior proceeding, the court found that Bausch
& Lomb had infringed Wesley's patent and entered a permanent injunction
barring future infringement.' 19 Subsequently, Wesley alleged that Bausch &
Lomb violated the injunction. 120 In contrast to Rotec and MEMC, in which
the Federal Circuit ultimately found no offer had been made, 121 the Wesley
court found sufficient evidence of an offer for sale. 122 This made the scope of
"offer for sale" liability essential to the court's decision to permit additional
discovery on the question of continued infringement. 123
In reaching the conclusion that an offer within the United States is
sufficient to find infringement liability, the court relied on three primary
arguments. First, the court analyzed Federal Circuit precedent finding that
authority supported a cause of action based solely on the domestic offer. 124
manifesting an 'offer for sale' as sought by Plaintiffs."). Id. The courts though appear to
disfavor allowing defendants to rely upon this type of strategic behavior to avoid liability.
See, e.g., 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 (finding price quotation letters constitute offers
despite the fact that they "state on their face that they are purportedly not offers" because
"to treat them as anything other than offers to sell would be to exalt form over
substance"); Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Electronics, Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152,
1172 n.49 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting "the possibility of creating... a 'legal fiction' merely
to escape liability").
117 256 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Del. 2003).
118 /dat 235..
119 1d. at 229. The injunction enjoined Bausch & Lomb from "making, using,
offering for sale, or selling in the United States" the infringing products. Id.
120 Id.
121 See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1376 (Fed Cir. 2005); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
122 Wesley Jessen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 235 ("Wesley Jessen has made a prima facie
showing that commercial transactions between Bausch & Lomb and a related entity in
Ireland may involve offers to sell or sales within the United States.").
123 Id. ("The Court, therefore, will grant Wesley Jessen's request to take discovery
directed to uncovering whether Bausch & Lomb has engaged in offering for sale, or
selling, in the United States ....").
124 Id. at 233. Relying on 3D Systems and Rotec, the court concluded:
What emerges from Federal Circuit cases dealing with "offer to sell" liability under
§ 271(a) is the conclusion that an unauthorized "offer to sell" a patented invention
within the United States creates a separate cause of action for patent
infringement.... The geographic location and physical destination of the subject
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This finding clearly comports with the Rotec majority's view of the territorial
nature of patent rights. 125 Second, the court applied a traditional canon of
statutory interpretation to reject the defendant's argument that a sale within
the United States must be contemplated by the offer. 126 Finally, the Wesley
court concluded that the purpose of "offer for sale" liability required
protecting the patentee against competing offers regardless of the location of
the contemplated sale. 127 After analyzing these factors, the court succinctly
concluded "that an unauthorized offer to sell a patented product, which offer
is made in the United States, is a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 1 28
The most recent district court case to adopt the Rotec majority position is
SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 129 The facts in SEB closely mirrored
those in Wesley, in that a plaintiff-patentee alleged an infringing offer to sell;
however, in SEB, the record already contained substantial evidence that the
defendant had in fact made an offer within the United States. 130
Moreover, for the purpose of establishing "offer for sale" infringement,
the court appears to have accepted that the infringing products were sold
matter of the "offer" appear to be immaterial to the analysis, so long as the "offer"
was made in the United States.
Id. (citations omitted).
125 Id. at 233 ("The question thus [becomes] 'whether Defendants' activities in the
United States ... [were] sufficient to establish an 'offer for sale,' as that phrase is used in
§ 271(a).") (citing Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1251.).
126 Id. at 234 ("Requiring that there be an actual or contemplated infringing 'sale' of
the invention for there to also be an unlawful 'offer to sell' makes the 'offer to sell'
language in § 271(a) superfluous."); cf Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14
(1986) (noting statutes should be construed to avoid finding any language superfluous or
unnecessary).
127 Wesley Jessen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 235 ("Allowing competing offers to sell would
be to the detriment of a patentee's opportunity to offer sales, whether foreign or
domestic."). The Wesley court also found support for this conclusion in Supreme Court
precedent. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) ("[If
the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is
fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market
power.").
128 Wesley Jessen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
129 412 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
130 The facts included: a formal vendor relationship between the defendant and its
U.S. representative; identification of the U.S. representative as "negotiator," "Rep.," and
"U.S. Contact" in a Terms of Purchase agreement; meeting and phone calls occurring in
the United States; and that "any purchase orders for the [infringing product] were sent to
[defendant] via [the U.S. Contact]." Id. at 342.
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outside of the United States. 131 In reaching the conclusion that an offer made
within the United States was sufficient, the SEB court largely adopted the
analysis from Wesley focusing on Federal Circuit precedent, statutory
interpretation, and the purpose of "offer for sale" liability.132 The court again
emphasized that a patentee may suffer economic harm even if the offer
contemplates a foreign sale. 133 After reviewing these arguments the court
concluded SEB had produced sufficient evidence to permit "a reasonable
jury to conclude that Defendants made an offer to sell [the infringing
product]... in the United States"'134 and allowed the plaintiffs case to move
forward.135
B. Cases Requiring a Contemplated Sale Within the United States to
Establish Infringement
Another line of district court cases has reached the opposite conclusion-
that an offer made in the United States which contemplates a foreign sale
cannot constitute patent infringement under § 27 1(a). The leading case in this
line of decisions is Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp.13 6
In Quality Tubing, the alleged infringer negotiated and executed a contract in
Houston, Texas for the foreign manufacture and sale of a product covered by
a United States patent. 137 The plaintiff claimed that by this activity the
defendant had engaged in selling or offering to sell a potentially infringing
product within the United States, and asked the court to enjoin manufacturing
activity in Scotland. 138 Initially, the court considered the plaintiff's claim that
the defendant had sold the infringing product in the United States, but
rejected that claim because "[t]he negotiation and execution of a contract to
sell is not, standing alone, a sale that is an act of infringement . . .,139
Turning to the plaintiffs "offer for sale" claim, the court acknowledged this
131 Id. at 340 ("Simply because [the defendant] sold the [infringing products] F.O.B.
China does not mean that it did not offer to sell the [infringing products] in the United
States.").
132 Id. at 340-42.
133 Id. at 341 n.6 ("Any offers that Defendants made in the United States would
work to the commercial detriment to SEB, regardless of whether the resulting sales took
place in the United States or China.").
134 Id. at 341.
135 Id. at 349 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment of non-
infringement).
136 75 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
137 Id. at 614.
138 Id. The defendant, a United States company, had contracted with a Norwegian
company to have the allegedly infringing product manufactured in Scotland. Id.
139 Id. at 621.
[Vol. 70:2
CONSTRUING PA TENT INFRINGEMENT
case presented an issue of first impression: 140 "whether an offer made in the
United States to sell products manufactured and delivered outside the United
States violates the United States patent laws."'14
The court ultimately accepted the defendant's construction of the statute
requiring "the offer to be made within the United States and to contemplate a
sale within the United States,"' 142 and advanced four principle justifications
for this conclusion. First, the court found the purpose of "expanding the list
of infringing activities ... to include an 'offer to sell' rather than merely a
'sale' [was to protect] a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing
activity."' 143 This purpose, however, requires that the later activity, i.e. the
contemplated sale, would constitute infringement. 144 By defining the purpose
of "offer for sale" liability in this manner, a domestic offer for a
contemplated foreign sale falls outside the intended protection of the
statute. 145 The second justification offered relies upon § 271 (i) to support the
conclusion "that Congress intended the 'offer to sell' language to push back
the point in time at which" infringement occurs. 146 This is the same argument
that Judge Newman would later offer concurring in Rotec.14 7
A third reason expressed for the chosen construction of "offer for sale"
was that "[t]his construction does not expand the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States patent laws .... -148 The court found support for this
proposition in Supreme Court precedent noting that "United States patent
laws apply within the United States and have no extraterritorial effect."'1 49
140 Quality Tubing was decided during the interval between the district court and
Federal Circuit decisions in Rotec; however, because the Federal Circuit largely followed
the reasoning of the district court opinion, the discussion of Rotec in Quality Tubing is
consistent with the Federal Circuit's subsequent decision. Compare Rotec Industries, Inc.
v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000), with Rotec Industries, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 810 (C.D. Ii. 1998).
141 Quality Tubing, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
142 Id. at 614.
143 Id. at 623.
144 Id. at 624 ("[T]he expansion of the statute to include the earlier stage of an
infringing activity... means that the sale for which the offer is made must itself be an act
of infringement.").
145 Id. ("If it were sufficient to have an offer, in the United States, to sell in a foreign
country, the sale offered would not be an act of infringement, and the offer to sell would
not be an earlier stage of an infringing activity.") (emphasis added).
146 Id.
147 See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 85-87 and
accompanying text.
148 Quality Tubing, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
149 Id. at 618 (citing Deepsouth Packaging Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531
(1972)).
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Further, by limiting "offer to sell" to only those offers that contemplate a sale
within the United States, the court avoids impermissibly extending the rights
of patentees or the scope of United States patent law. 150
Finally, the court focused on economic policy and found that limiting
infringement to only those offers contemplating a sale within the United
States to be in the best interest of American businesses.151 The court focused
on the additional uncertainty that could result if an offer for foreign sale
constituted patent infringement. 152 The court reasoned that a per se rule
would "avoid[] confusion over whether an offer to sell a product in a foreign
market, made during an international telephone call or in an electronic mail
transmission, or in a letter mailed in or faxed in the United States, is an act of
infringement."1 53
The next district court case in the Quality Tubing line of decisions was
Cybiotronics Ltd. v. Golden Source Electronics, Ltd.154 In Cybiotronics, the
plaintiff-patentee argued that the defendant made offers within the United
States to sell an infringing product. 155 Applying the "commercial offer"
standard from Rotec, the court concluded the plaintiff had raised a genuine
issue of fact regarding whether an offer was made in the United States.156
However, the court nonetheless granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement finding that the making of an offer was
immaterial because the contemplated sale was to occur outside the United
States. 157
150 Id. at 623-25; see also Edwin D. Garlepp, An Analysis of the Patentee's New
Exclusive Right to "Offer to Sell," 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 315, 326 (1999).
151 Quality Tubing, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
152 Id. at 623-24. The court noted that a hypothetical broker located in New York
arranging for a patented invention to be both manufactured and sold in a foreign country
might be subject to liability under a contrary construction of "offer for sale"
infringement. Id.; see also Garlepp, supra note 150, at 326.
153 Quality Tubing, 75 F. Supp. 2d. at 625. The court also found that, if the holder of
a United States patent desired protection in the foreign market, Congress desired the
patent holder seek patent protection in that foreign country. Id. (citing Deepsouth, 406
U.S. at 531).
154 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (2001).
155 Id. at 1153-54.
156 Id. at 1169. The plaintiff presented evidence suggesting that the defendant
received transmissions concerning the price and quality in New York, and that the
defendant's "representatives may have personally come to New York to conduct
negotiations." Id. at 1168-69.
157 Id. at 1170. The court noted:
Even if what [the defendant] did in this case could credibly be described as an "offer
to sell," and even if that "offer to sell" could credibly be said to have been made
"within the United States," liability under Section 271(a) does not extend to "offers
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In reaching the conclusion that "offer for sale" infringement exists only
for contemplated sales within the United States, the Cybiotronics court
followed the reasoning of Quality Tubing.158 The court strongly endorsed the
view that the purpose of "offer for sale" liability was to advance in time
when infringement liability attaches to preempt an otherwise infringing
sale.' 59 Cybiotronics also followed Quality Tubing regarding territoriality as
a limitation on the patentee's exclusive rights. 160 Finally, the court
analogized: "[T]he 'offer to sell' language is to a 'sale' [that] infringes the
statute what an 'attempt' prosecution is to the crime that is attempted."' 161
Other district courts have endorsed Quality Tubing and Cybiotronics in
dicta. 162 In Synaptic, the plaintiff-patentee alleged that the defendant violated
§ 271(a) by making infringing offers to sell binding assays 163 through its
catalogues and website. 164 The defendant, MDS, is a service organization
that performs laboratory research for its customers. 165 The actual testing at
issue in Synaptic was conducted by MDS's affiliate in Taipei, Taiwan, and
to sell" which do not contemplate actual "sales" of goods to be consummated within
the United States.
Id. at 1170.
158 Id. Although Cybiotronics was decided after the Federal Circuit's Rotec
decision, references to the Rotec majority and concurrence are notably absent from the
portion of the Cybiotronics opinion adopting the statutory construction advanced by
Quality Tubing.
159 Id. at 1171. Cybiotronics viewed Quality Tubing as reasoning that:
[Tihe addition of the "offer to sell" language to Section 271(a) was not intended to
add a whole new substantive basis for liability to the statute, but was merely
intended to incorporate into the statute coverage of activities that might pre-date the
actual consummation of a sale within the United States, but which nonetheless
contemplate such a final sale.
Id. at 1171 (emphasis in original).
160 Cybiotronics, 130 F. Supp. 2d. at 1171 ("[T]he 'offer to sell' language was not
intended to (and could not) extend the protection of a U.S. patent to allow the patentee to
also prevent sales taking place in other countries. Our patent laws are limited to the
United States.").
161 Id. ("'[o]ffer to sell' . . . merely allows a plaintiff to seek liability for activity that
does not constitute a 'sale,' but which nonetheless threatens the patentee's right to an
exclusive American market.").
162 See Synaptic Pharmaceutical Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452
(D.N.J. 2002); Wing Shing Products (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
163 An assay is means for determining "the amount of a particular constituent of a
mixture, or of the potency of a drug." The Free Dictionary, http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/assay (last accessed Feb. 18, 2008).
164 Synaptic, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
165 Id. at 455.
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the test results were delivered to MDS's customers in the United States. 166
Denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement,
the court found that the defendant had in fact made offers to sell in the
United States, and that the sales were consummated in the United States. 167
Although Synaptic adopted the Quality Tubing construction, the
application of "offer for sale" infringement under § 271(a) in Synaptic leaves
several questions unanswered. First, the patents at issue concerned methods
and processes which are typically only infringed by use; 168 therefore, the
"offer to sell" analysis under § 271 (a) appears misplaced. Second, if the court
viewed the "binding assay" as the product produced by a patented process, an
"offer for sale" analysis would have been appropriate but only under
§ 271(g).169 Finally, the court relied upon Quality Tubing and Cybiotronics
for the rule that an offer must contemplate a sale within the United States to
be infringing, but did not discuss either the Rotec or the Halmar decisions
that appear to conflict with that conclusion. 170
Interestingly, one district has split internally over the proper construction
of "offers to sell" patent infringement. 171 The court in Wing Shing confronted
the typical fact pattern of a plaintiff-patentee alleging an offer made in the
United States for a contemplated sale in a foreign country and found two
alternative grounds for dismissing the plaintiff's claim. 172 Initially, the court
found the defendant's actions within the United States did not constitute an
offer to sell, and lacking that predicate action, there could be no infringement
liability. 173 Although the plaintiff maintained that a governing law provision
166 Id.
167 Id. at 463.
168 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Congress has consistently expressed the view that it understands infringement of
method claims under section 271(a) to be limited to use."); see also Joy Tech., Inc. v.
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("A method claim is directly infringed only
by one practicing the patented method.").
169 See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g) (2007) ("Whoever without authority imports into the
United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is
made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer.").
170 See Synaptic, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
171 Compare Wing Shing Products (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479
F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (adopting view that domestic offer for foreign sale is
not infringement), with SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (adopting opposite view).
172 Wing Shing, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 406-07.
173 Id. at 405-06 ("Plaintiff can point to no activity preceding ... entry into the
Supply Agreement that occurred within the United States.").
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in a supply agreement established an offer was made in the United States, 174
the court rejected this argument which would "exalt form over substance" in
conflict with Federal Circuit precedent.1 75 Finally, the court concluded that
even if an offer had been made within the United States, the "'offer to sell'
theory of liability must then fail because the sales contemplated by the offer
.. were intended to occur outside the United States ... . 176
Focusing upon Judge Newman's concurrence in Rotec,177 the court
offered two justifications for adopting the view that "offer for sale"
infringement required a contemplated sale within the United States. First,
relying on requirements that both the making of the offer and the
contemplated sale must be during the term of the patent, 178 the court
reasoned "by analogy [that] a prohibited 'offer to sell' made within the
United States must contemplate a prohibited sale, that is, a sale that would
also occur in the United States."' 179 The court in Wing Shing also found that
"such a reading does not render the addition of the 'offer to sell' language
... 'superfluous'."180 Because the "offer to sell" language creates a separate
"cause of action [even if the] offer is never accepted or otherwise
consummated by an [infringing sale]."'1 81
C. The Most Recent Decision
The preceding sections illustrate a nearly uniform split among district
courts as to the proper construction of the "offers to sell" form of
infringement.' 82 The most recent district court to directly address this issue
reviewed these competing lines of authority and found that the issue remains
unsettled. 183 In Semiconductor Energy, the plaintiff-patentee alleged that the
174 Id. at 394 ("According to the Supply Agreement's 'Governing Law' provision,
the Agreement was deemed to be made in Florida .... ).
175 Id. at 406 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
176 Id.
177 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
178 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); id. § 271(i).
179 Wing Shing, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
180 Id.
181 Id. (rejecting the contrary reasoning advanced by the same district in SEB)
182 See supra Part 1V.A and Part 1V.B.
183 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp.
2d 1084, 1110-11 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In light of the fact that the parties here rely on
District Court opinions for support of their respective positions, it would appear that this
issue is unsettled."). In contrast, a district court in Delaware recently upheld a jury
finding of infringement based in part upon finding an offer made in the United States to
sell an infringing product to a foreign customer. See TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp.,
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defendant made infringing offers in the United States. 184 The court found that
the material facts were not in dispute: "The parties acknowledge that [the
defendant] makes offers of sale within the United States pertaining to
products which are manufactured and ultimately sold outside the country."'185
However, much like the district courts previously discussed, the parties
disagreed over the proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement. 186
The Semiconductor Energy court framed the legal issue as "whether an
offer of sale made in the United States can constitute direct infringement if
the product is ultimately sold in a foreign country."'187 Beginning its analysis,
the court noted that "[t]he Federal Circuit appears to have answered this
question in the affirmative in Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp."'1 88 The
appearance of an answer, however, is apparently not an answer. 189 The
parties offered "the court little support outside the holdings of' the Halmar
and Quality Tubing lines of cases. 190 Finding a lack of controlling authority
from the Federal Circuit and a division among the few district courts to have
confronted this issue, the Semiconductor Energy court turned to the Supreme
Court for guidance. 191 In Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,192 the Supreme
Court emphasized the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States patent law. 193 Although Microsoft dealt with a different section
568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 516 (D. Del. 2008). Although not directly addressed in the reported
opinion, by allowing the question of infringement to reach the jury, the Delaware court
must have accepted the premise that domestic offers contemplating foreign sales may
constitute an infringing act.
184 Semiconductor Energy, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
185 Id. The court had previously determined that the asserted claims of the plaintiffs
patent covered the defendant's products, and therefore the plaintiff was granted summary
judgment of infringement with respect to the defendant's domestic sales. Id. at 1093.
186 Id. at 1110. The court noted: "The parties' dispute regarding direct infringement
for [the defendant's] so-called 'foreign sales' is purely legal. The parties disagree over
whether an 'offer of sale' made in the United States may give rise to direct infringement
where the sale is not consummated in the United States." Id.
187 Semiconductor Energy, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
188 Id. (citation omitted).
189 Id. ("[T]he Federal Circuit did not squarely hold that a domestic offer of sale had
given rise to liability for direct infringement where the sale was to be completed outside
the country.").
190 Id. at 1111. The court observed that the parties were "inviting the court to simply
choose a line of cases to follow." Id.
191 Id. Semiconductor Energy was the first district court to address the scope of
"offers to sell" patent infringement after the Supreme Court's April 30, 2007 decision in
Microsoft Corp. v. A T & T Corp.
192 550 U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
193 Id. at 1758. The Microsoft decision and the focus on territoriality will be
addressed infra Part V.
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of the Patent Act,194 the Semiconductor Energy court was influenced by
Microsoft to adopt the view of the Quality Tubing line of cases holding "an
'offer of sale' may constitute direct infringement only if the contemplated
sale is to take place within the United States."' 195
The preceding review of district court cases highlights the lingering
divide over whether an offer made in the United States to sell a patented
invention outside the United States constitutes patent infringement. In the
next Part, the Supreme Court's Microsoft decision will be reviewed to
determine whether the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States patent laws provides a satisfactory justification for deciding
that a domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale cannot infringe a United
States patent.
V. MICROSOFT TERRITORIALITY: AN INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR
RESOLVING THE DEBATE
The previous Parts of this Note reviewed the origin of "offers to sell"
patent infringement, 196 the limited interpretive guidance from the Federal
Circuit, 197 and the continuing division between district courts over the proper
construction.1 98 Much of the prior analysis of this issue has focused upon
principles of territoriality, 199 and the Supreme Court's Microsoft20 0 decision
is likely to increase this trend.20 1 In the following sections, the territoriality
analysis of the Microsoft decision will be explored and then used as a guide
to assess whether territoriality provides a coherent framework for analyzing
this issue. The final section of this Part will conclude that territoriality
principles alone improperly skew the analysis and that an alternative
approach is required.
194 At issue in Microsoft was the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) related to the
supplying of computer software from the United States for installation in foreign
countries. See id. at 1750.
195 Semiconductor Energy, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 ("In light of the strong
presumption against extraterritorial application, the court holds that 'the 'offer to sell'
language was not intended to (and could not) extend the protection of a U.S. patent to
allow the patentee to ... prevent sales taking place in other countries."' (citing
Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Electronics, Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1171
(2001)).
196 See supra Part II.
197 See supra Part III.
198 See supra Part IV.
199 See, e.g., Garlepp, supra note 150; Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15.
200 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
201 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2119 (2008).
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A. Reinvigorated Territoriality as Applied in Microsoft Corp. v.
AT & T Corp.
In an article analyzing the presumption against extraterritoriality,
Professor Dodge identifies three different forms of the presumption that have
been employed by the courts.202 The traditional view of the presumption,
articulated by Justice Holmes, is that "acts of Congress should apply only to
conduct that occurs within the United States, unless a contrary intent appears,
regardless of whether that conduct causes effects within the United
States."203
While the Supreme Court's application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality has varied over time and subject matter,204 the Court
appears to have adopted Justice Holmes's traditional view in Microsoft.205
The patent infringement alleged in Microsoft involved a different section of
the patent infringement statute than previously discussed.206 AT & T, the
plaintiff-patentee, claimed that Microsoft's Windows operating system
infringed AT & T's patent.207 Both parties agreed that Windows, when
installed on a computer, would infringe.208 Microsoft, therefore, conceded
202 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 88 (1998).
203 Id. at 88 (emphasis added). The alternative views are that acts of Congress apply:
1) "only to conduct that causes effects within the United States ... regardless of where
that conduct occurs;" and 2) "to conduct occurring within or having an effect within the
United States." Id. (emphasis added). These formulations are attributed to Judge Bork
and Chief Judge Mikva, respectively. Id.
204 For a detailed review of the Supreme Court's use, or nonuse, of the presumption,
see Dodge, supra note 202, at 9 1-100.
205 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007) ("Foreign
conduct is [generally] the domain of foreign law.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
206 The section at issue in Microsoft was § 271(f)(1), which states:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(0(1) (2006).
207 Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1753. AT & T owned a patent on an "apparatus ...
capable of digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech." Id.208 Id.
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liability for domestic installation of Windows.209 However, Microsoft
contested AT & T's claim of infringement under § 271 (f) for installation of
Windows on foreign-made computers. 210
Central to the Court's territoriality analysis was the question whether
Microsoft "supplie[d] ... from the United States" components of the foreign
made computers. 211 The Microsoft Court's analysis of the allegedly
infringing activity focused on the difference between "supplying" and
"copying" software.212 Microsoft "supplied" from the United States a
"master version" of Windows; foreign manufacturers then "copied" the
master version and installed the foreign-made copies on the foreign-made
computers. Because the "master version" was not installed on foreign-made
computers, the Court found that Microsoft had not "supplied" a component
used in the combination. 213
The Court bolstered its conclusion by noting that "the presumption
against extraterritoriality" would resolve any doubt in the construction of
§ 271(f).214 By segmenting the conduct into domestic supplying and foreign
copying, the Microsoft Court's approach to extraterritoriality reflects the
209 Id. ("Microsoft stipulated that by installing Windows on its own computers
during the software development process [and] by licensing copies of Windows to
manufacturers of computers sold in the United States, [it infringed] AT & T's patent.").
2 10 Id. AT & T argued that by sending a "master version of Windows" to foreign
manufactures, Microsoft was supplying a component of a patented invention in violation
of§ 271(0. Id.
211 Id. at 1754. The case also raised the question of "when, or in what form, does
software qualify as a 'component' under § 271(f)?" Id. at 1753. Ultimately, the Court
concluded that an "[actual, physical] copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract,
qualifies as a 'component' under § 271(o." Id. at 1756. This holding, while important, is
beyond the scope of this Note. For commentary related to this aspect of the Microsoft
decision, see Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law
to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. §271(1), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 557 (2004). See
also Eric W. Guttag, When Offshore Activities Become Infringing: Applying § 271 to
Technologies that "Straddle" Territorial Borders, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Peter
Thomas Luce, Comment, Hiding Behind Borders in a Borderless World:
Extraterritoriality Doctrine and the Inadequacy of U.S. Software Patent Protections in a
Networked Economy, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259 (2007).
212 Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1757.
213 Id. The Court noted:
[T]he very components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof,
trigger § 271(0 liability when combined abroad to form the patented invention at
issue.... [T]he copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign computers were
not themselves supplied from the United States. Indeed, those copies did not exist
until they were generated by third parties outside the United States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
214 Id. at 1758.
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traditional view of Justice Holmes.215 Only the domestic conduct, i.e.
supplying, could serve as the predicate act for infringement liability.216
Liability for infringing a United States patent could not be triggered by
foreign conduct, i.e. copying.2 17 Moreover, the Court rejected AT & T's
argument that a single act of "supplying" from the United States could
trigger liability for all subsequent copying of the supplied software.2 18 By
confining the infringement analysis to the specific conduct occurring within
the United States, the Court avoided the potential conflicts that may arise
from extraterritorial application of the United States law. 219
B. Applying Microsoft Territoriality to "Offers to Sell" Infringement
As discussed in Part IV.C, one district court found the territoriality
principles espoused in Microsoft sufficiently persuasive to conclude that an
offer made in the United States for a contemplated sale in a foreign country
does not infringe.220 This result should be unsurprising because the
arguments typically advanced for limiting infringing offers to only those
contemplating a domestic sale are heavily influenced by the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States patent laws.221
A territoriality based analysis of the "offers to sell" language must begin
with the fundamental limitation that a United States patent does not give the
patentee a right to prohibit sales of the patented invention in other
countries.222 As one commentator stated, "prohibiting mere offers in the
United States made solely to effectuate lawful transactions outside the United
215 See Dodge, supra note 202, at 85 (identifying the traditional view as "the general
and almost universal rule ... that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done" (quoting Am. Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909))).
216 Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1757.
2 17 Id. "In short, foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the
manufacture and sale of components of patented inventions in foreign countries." Id. at
1759.
2 18 Id. at 1758-59. The Court noted that protection of patented inventions in foreign
markets required "obtaining and enforcing foreign patents." Id. at 1759.
219 Id. at 1758 (noting the "legitimate sovereign interests of other nations" as one
rational for assuming that Congress legislates only with respect to domestic conduct).
220 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F.
Supp. 2d 1084, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2007), discussed supra Part LV.C.
221 See, e.g., Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 731-38.
222 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915)
(holding foreign sales do not infringe a United States patent); see also Microsoft v.
AT & T, 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007) (noting a "patentee's rights over invention apply
to manufacture, use, or sale 'throughout the United States"' (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1))).
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States is, in effect, an indirect regulation of that foreign activity. '223
Regulating foreign activity, even indirectly, runs afoul of the traditional
presumption against extraterritoriality as articulated by the Microsoft
Court.
2 2 4
Similarly, the argument that § 271(i) requires a contemplated sale within
the United States is supported by a focus on territoriality.225 The text of
§ 271(i) defines an infringing "offer for sale" to be "that in which the sale
will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent. '226 One reading of
this statute, the one adopted by Judge Newman in Rotec, is that an offer for
sale is only infringing if the contemplated sale could infringe the United
States patent.227 Because a sale may only infringe when the sale is completed
in the United States, § 271(i) supports limiting infringing offers to only those
contemplating domestic sales.228
Reliance upon other countries' construction of similar provisions is also
supported by the Microsoft Court's emphasis on respecting the "'legitimate
sovereign interests of other nations."' '229 As previously discussed, "the
United Kingdom limits infringement for offers to sell to those offers in which
the contemplated sale will occur within the country of protection. '230 In light
of the growing trend to harmonize international intellectual property laws,231
courts relying upon Microsoft are likely to find the United Kingdom's
223 Garlepp, supra note 150, at 326.
224 See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1758. The Court's primary concern with regulating
foreign sales appears to be the potential for conflict with foreign laws. Id. ("[F]oreign law
'may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors,
competitors, and the public in patented inventions."') (citation omitted). This need "to
protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord" is one of the primary justifications for the existence
of the presumption against extraterritoriality. See Dodge, supra note 202, at 112 (quoting
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
225 See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 733-34.
226 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2006).
227 See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Newman, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying
text.
228 Id. at 1258-59.
229 Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1758 (quoting F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)).
230 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 732.
231 See supra Part II (discussing formation of TRIPS); see also Holbrook,
Territoriality, supra note 15, at 749 (recommending consideration of foreign law to
"foster international patent norms"); Lee, supra note 90, at 18-19 (identifying
harmonization of international intellectual property laws as a controversial goal of some
courts).
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territorially limited construction of "offers to sell" infringement increasingly
persuasive. 232
Finally, Professor Holbrook argues that the reluctance to apply copyright
law extraterritorially provides another justification for limiting the "offers to
sell" infringement to only contemplated domestic sales.233 Professor
Holbrook relies upon the Ninth Circuit's holding that "domestic
authorization of foreign activities that would violate section 106 [of the
Copyright Act] if performed domestically [is] not copyright
infringement. '234 As in Microsoft, a primary concern in Subafilms was the
potential for conflict between laws of the United States and other
countries.235 Although courts have not yet relied directly upon Subafilms to
construe the patent statute, "consideration of copyright law would support the
growing authority that an infringing offer to sell must contemplate a
domestic sale in order to infringe, just as a domestic authorization of
infringing activity must contemplate domestic infringing activity .... ,,236
Each of the arguments for limiting "offers to sell" infringement solely to
contemplated domestic sales relies, at least in part, upon the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States law. The persuasive
impact of these arguments is thus likely to increase in light of the Microsoft
Court's reaffirmation that the United States patent laws "do[] not rule the
world."237
232 See, e.g., Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1259 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment)
(presenting argument for relying upon the United Kingdom's interpretation).
233 See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 735-38 (analogizing the
patentee's exclusive right in "offers to sell" to the copyright holder's exclusive "right to
authorize" the making of copies).
234Id. at 736; see also Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088,
1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
235 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097. Declining to apply the Copyright Act
extraterritorially, the court stated:
The application of American copyright law to acts of infringement that occur
entirely overseas clearly could [disrupt efforts to secure a more stable intellectual
property regime]. Extraterritorial application of American law would be contrary to
the spirit of the Berne Convention, and might offend other member nations by
effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previously it was assumed
to govern. Consequently, an extension of extraterritoriality might undermine
Congress's objective of achieving "'effective and harmonious' copyright laws
among all nations."
Id. (citation omitted).
236 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 738.
237 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007).
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C. An Alternative Application of Microsoft
While the previous section illustrated how Microsoft's territoriality
principles may be used to limit "offers to sell" infringement to only
contemplated domestic sales, an alternative view of Microsoft may in fact
support the opposite conclusion. The version of territoriality articulated in
Microsoft, that United States patent laws do "not extend to foreign
activities," 238 could be viewed as analogous to the Rotec majority's
application of the territoriality principle.239
The similarity between Rotec and Microsoft stems from the scope of
conduct that may be considered in the infringement inquiry. In Microsoft, the
Court found that "copying" by foreign manufacturers was distinct from the
act of "supplying" that Microsoft performed in the United States.240 The act
of copying, occurring outside of the United States, was found to be beyond
the reach of United States patent law and therefore non-infringing.241 To
determine Microsoft's liability, the Court looked solely to the domestic
conduct of "supplying" and found no infringement because the supplied
component, the master disk, was never intended to be combined with the
foreign made computers. 242 Similarly, in Rotec, the court focused its inquiry
on the defendant's domestic acts, but found those acts did not satisfy the
requirements of the infringement statute.243 In both cases, the extraterritorial
activities were not relevant to the infringement determination. 244
Another significant similarity is that infringement under § 271(f) does not
require the contemplated foreign activity to actually occur. 245 In Waymark,
the Federal Circuit concluded infringement liability under § 271(f) required
only the intention that components supplied from the United States will be
combined abroad, not the actual combination of those components.246 The
238 Id. (citation omitted).
239 See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(noting "'infringement... cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign
country"' (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650
(1915))).
240 Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1758-59.
241 Id. at 1759.
242 Id. at 1757.
243 Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255. The Rotec court found no evidence of a commercial
offer made in the United States. Id.
244 See id. at 1251 (describing extraterritorial activities as irrelevant to the
infringement inquiry).
245 Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
246 Id. at 1368 ("At no point does the statutory language require or suggest that the
infringer must actually combine or assemble the components. A party can intend that a
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Waymark court found the presumption against extraterritoriality supported
this construction because of the potential difficulty in proving acts in a
foreign country.247
Although Microsoft did not address this aspect of § 271(f), by applying
territoriality principles to confine the infringement inquiry to only domestic
acts, Microsoft could appear to support the proposition that the actual
assembly of components in a foreign country, or contemplated sales, is
irrelevant to the infringement determination. 248 Under either infringement
provision, the primary activity-supplying or offering-must be domestic,
and the limiting aspect-for combination or to sell-serves only to define the
scope of the first.249
D. Critique of the Territoriality Focus-Geography is Not Supreme
The Semiconductor Energy court relied upon Microsoft to invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality; 250 but as previously discussed,
Microsoft may support conflicting conclusions as to whether a domestic offer
for a contemplated foreign sale should be deemed to infringe.251 Even if
Microsoft itself could not be viewed as supporting both sides of this debate,
the rush to apply territoriality principles to the "offers to sell" analysis leads
to several additional analytic problems.252
shipped component will ultimately be included in an assembled product even if the
combination never occurs.").
24 7 Id. As the court explained:
Admittedly, infringement without a completed infringing embodiment is not the
norm in patent law, but it is reasonable in the context of 271(0(2). If 271(0(2)
required actual assembly abroad, then infringement would depend on proof of
infringement in a foreign country. This requirement would both raise the difficult
obstacle of proving infringement in foreign countries and pose the appearance of
"giving extraterritorial effect to United States patent protection."
Id. (citation omitted).
248 See id. (finding that "shipping components of an invention abroad without
combining them" and "offering to sell an invention without actually selling it" are two
forms of infringement where a completed embodiment of the patented invention is never
created).
249 Compare id. (finding that "for combination" limits liability for "supplying" to
circumstances where the defendant intends for the components to be combined abroad),
with HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding
that "to sell" limits liability for "offering" to circumstances where the defendant intends a
"potential commercial transaction").
250 See supra Part IV.C.
251 Compare Part V.B, with Part V.C.
252 One problem, not unique to Microsoft but still worth noting, is that strict
application of territoriality will make certain types of patent infringement unenforceable
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A principle justification of the presumption against extraterritoriality has
been "the need 'to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord,' ' 253 and
this justification is embodied in the application of the presumption in both
Microsoft and Rotec.254 In both cases, the courts noted the impropriety of
applying United States law to exclude sales of patented inventions in foreign
countries. 255 Professor Holbrook succinctly summarizes the perceived clash
by arguing that if a domestic offer for foreign sale is construed as infringing,
the effect would be "limiting [the foreign] country's access to an invention
which should be in the public domain under its laws." 256 This perceived
clash, however, overlooks one critical fact-offering and selling are separate
and distinct actions.257 Even if a patentee exercised an exclusive right to
under any country's laws. For example, if steps of a patented process can be relocated in
separate countries, a relatively straightforward task in a digital environment, potential
infringers could effectively immunize themselves from infringement liability. See NTP,
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding "a
process cannot be used 'within' the United States as required by section 271(a) unless
each of the steps is performed within this country"); see also Melissa Feeney Wasserman,
Note, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 281, 281 (noting that "territoriality... [makes] ... unauthorized practice
of a patented invention across national borders ... not actionable under U.S. patent
law"). Cf Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883,
889 (1984) (observing in the antitrust context that "[s]tringent limits on extra-territorial
application of competition laws are likely to produce gaps in which no nation's laws are
applicable").
253 Dodge, supra note 202, at 90. Professor Dodge summarizes six reasons that have
been advanced to support the general presumption against extraterritoriality:
(1) international law limitations on extraterritoriality, which Congress should be
assumed to have observed; (2) consistency with domestic conflict-of-laws rules; (3)
the need to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord; (4) the commonsense notion that
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind; ... (5) separation-of-
powers concerns-i.e. that the determination of whether and how to apply federal
legislation to conduct abroad raises difficult and sensitive policy questions that tend
to fall outside both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of
the judiciary; [and (6)] that it provides legislators with a clear background rule
which allows them to predict the application of their statutes.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
254 See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1758-59; Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1251.
255 See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1750; Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1251.
256 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 751.
257 Judge Rader noted a similar distinction when Microsoft was before the Federal
Circuit, concluding that "copying and supplying are different acts." AT & T Corp. v.
2009]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
exclude competitors from making "offers" in the United States, the patentee
could not prevent sales in foreign countries.258 Under the traditional view of
territoriality, foreign conduct is beyond the reach of United States law, and a
competitor seeking to avoid infringement of a United States patent may
simply relocate the infringing conduct-the act of offering-to a country
where the patentee lacks the right to prevent others from making offers to
sell.259 In short, a territoriality-centric analysis presumes a clash between
United States and foreign law, when in fact, a clash need not exist.
A central focus on territoriality may also explain a perceived problem
with relying on § 271(i) to conclude that an infringing offer requires a
contemplated sale within the United States.260 Professor Holbrook has
characterized "[rieliance on section 271(i) to support the conclusion that
offers that contemplate foreign sales are not cognizable acts of infringement
[as going] too far."261 The plain text of § 27 1(i) limits infringing offers to
only those contemplating a sale prior to the expiration of the patent.262
Professor Holbrook criticizes the conflation of a temporal limitation with a
geographic limitation.263 The more likely intended purpose of § 271(i) seems
to be maintaining the twenty-year limit on a patentee's exclusive rights.264
Prior to 1994, a patentee may have enjoyed limited exclusivity after the
patent expired by preventing competitors from establishing a supply of the
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting), rev'd, 550
U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
258 Any limitation or reduction in foreign sales would result, not from the
application of United States patent laws, but from market forces. Especially for
transactions between multinational corporations, "offering" in the United States may in
fact be the preferred means of coordinating foreign sales; however, both "offers" and
"sales" made outside the United States are clearly beyond the scope of the exclusive
rights granted to a United States patent holder.
259 See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 746 (noting the potential for a
competitor to avoid infringement by "directing its foreign agent to do its 'dirty work"'
(quoting Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 468, 477 (D.N.J. 1998))).
260 See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1259 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment)
(concluding that § 271(i) requires the contemplated sale be one that would infringe, and
therefore limited to only contemplated domestic sales).
261 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 747.
262 See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(i) (2006).
263 Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 747 ("Had Congress wanted the
contemplated sale to also be infringing [and therefore domestic], Congress could have
expressly said so.").
264 Id. at 747-48 ("Congress seemed to be concerned with inappropriately extending
the term of the patent by allowing recovery for sales outside the patent term ...."); see
also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (granting exclusive rights for twenty year term
measured from the date of filing).
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patented product.265 If the lead time for "offering" the product is greater than
for "making or importing" the product, a patentee could have further
extended the period of exclusivity by preventing competitors from soliciting
orders prior to the patent's expiration. 266 However, by limiting "offers to
sell" infringement to only traditional "commercial offers," 267 the Federal
Circuit has likely mitigated the risk of improperly extending the patent
term.268 Nevertheless, construing a temporal limitation into a geographic
limitation may be explained if territoriality is the primary concern.
Finally, a territoriality-based analysis of offer to sell infringement creates
a troubling asymmetry between liability and infringing conduct. The primary
conduct triggering infringement is an offer, which all courts agree must be
made in the United States.269  Adopting the presumption against
265 Cf World Trade Org. CANADA-PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS, WT/DS 14/R, at 161 (Mar. 17, 2000). The WTO recognized this de facto
extension of market exclusivity as part of the normal exploitation of a patent:
Some of the basic rights granted to all patent owners, and routinely exercised by all
patent owners, will typically produce a certain period of market exclusivity after the
expiration of a patent. For example, the separate right to prevent "making" the
patented product during the term of the patent often prevents competitors from
building an inventory needed to enter the market immediately upon expiration of a
patent. There is nothing abnormal about that more or less brief period of market
exclusivity after the patent has expired.
Id.
266 One district court summarized this argument, stating:
Section 271(i) appears to be designed to allow prospective competitors to begin to
market infringing products near the expiration of a patent, provided that any offers
for sale specify that the product will not be available until after expiration of the
patent. This prevents the effective term of the patent from being extended beyond
the statutory term by an amount of time equal to the time it takes competitors to gear
up advertising campaigns after expiration of a patent. ... Otherwise, those
prospective competitors would be effectively blocked from the marketplace for the
full life of the patent, plus the additional amount of time after expiration needed to
implement a marketing program for the previously infringing article.
Lifting Techs., Inc. v. Dixon Indus., Inc., No. CV-96-68-M-CCL, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21852, at *10-11 (D. Mont. Aug. 27, 1996), magistrate's recommendation adopted by,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21517 (D. Mont. Mar. 18, 1997). The exact duration of this
additional period of exclusivity would depend "in each particular situation [by] the
amount of time it takes to launch an advertising campaign in the industry of the patent at
issue." See Garlepp, supra note 150, at 318.
267 See Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55 (construing "offers to sell" to require a
traditional commercial offer).
268 By narrowly construing what constitutes an infringing "offer to sell," the Federal
Circuit would permit competitors to engage in marketing activities, such as advertising,
that fall short of formal commercial offers in anticipation of a patent's expiration. See id.
269 See, e.g., Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1257.
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extraterritoriality, the potential infringer's liability will turn on the content of
the offer that is made. Rejecting this approach to determining liability in the
copyright context, one district court stated: "Under this view, a phone call to
Nebraska results in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches.
In a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a difference. '270
The territoriality-based analysis of offer to sell infringement leads to the
same result, and potential infringers can easily avoid infringement by either
relocating their conduct, i.e. the offer, or by directing their sales to foreign
countries.271 "Given the increasingly international marketplace, allowing
infringers to so easily escape liability undermines the intellectual property
system. '272 The asymmetry between liability and potentially infringing
conduct is even more pronounced when viewed in light of the purpose of
"offer for sale" infringement-preventing competitors from "generating
interest.., to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee. '273 In cases
of either contemplated domestic or foreign sales, the competitor is generating
interest in a potentially infringing product; a territoriality-based analysis,
however, bypasses this important similarity and ties liability to geography-
the "distinction without a difference."274
270 Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (rejecting
the analysis of Subafilms); see also Sean A. Monticello, Note, Subafilms Revisited: The
Case for Imposing Liability on Domestic Authorizers of Extraterritorial Copyright
Infringements, 1 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 101, 115 (1999) ("If, however, someone
else can improperly authorize foreign exploitation and reap the rewards with impunity,
this may severely hinder the copyright owner's ability to recoup his investment, and the
incentive to create will suffer."). Reliance upon Subaflms has also been rejected because
Subafilms reasoned the addition of "authorization" was a codification of contributory
infringement. See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 747.
In the patent context, however, "offer to sell" infringement under section 271(a) has
nothing to do with contributory infringers. Contributory infringement is dealt with
expressly in the Patent Act in Sections 271(b) and (c). Thus, it is clear that offer to
sell infringement is a new form of direct liability. The language of the statute...
and the policy reasons ... such as an increasingly global market, strongly suggest
that domestic offers to sell that contemplate a foreign sale should be cognizable as a
form of direct infringement.
Id.
271 See Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15, at 746-47.
272 Id.
273 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
274 Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 595.
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VI. RECOMMENDATION
So far this Note has introduced the unresolved question of whether an
offer made in the United States to sell a patented invention in a foreign
country infringes a United States patent.275 The limited legislative history
surrounding the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the inclusion
of "offers to sell" infringement in the patent statute provided little guidance
on the proper construction. 276 Turning to the courts, the Federal Circuit
would appear to support extending infringement to domestic offers that
contemplate foreign sales;277 however, the nearly uniform split among
district courts on this issue confirms the issue remains unresolved.278
Searching for guidance, the most recent district court turned to the
territoriality principles espoused in Microsoft, but a territoriality-centric
analysis was shown to produce contradictory results for seemingly similar
conduct.279 Having concluded that territoriality, although relevant, cannot
decisively resolve this question, this Part will suggest that focusing upon a
patentee's economic interests in "offering to sell" a patented invention
provides a coherent analytic framework for determining whether domestic
offers contemplating foreign sales infringe and conclude that offers made in
the United States should constitute patent infringement regardless of the
location of any actual or contemplated sales.
A. Territoriality-Limited but Important Utility
When focusing on the patentee's economic interest in the exclusive right
to "offer to sell," or more specifically the right to exclude "offers to sell,"
principles of territoriality still serve several purposes. Most importantly, only
the patentee's economic interests "throughout the United States" are proper
for consideration. 280 While textual analyses of § 271 (a) do not reveal whether
"within the United States" applies only to the language "offers" or also
applies to the phrase "to sell," it is undisputed that the patentee's economic
interest stems from an offer occurring within the United States. A patentee
has no right under existing United States law to prevent others from making
offers in foreign countries; rather an inventor must seek a patent or other
275 See supra Part I.
276 See supra Part II.
277 See supra Part III.
278 See supra Part IV.
279 See supra Part V.
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
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protection under the laws of the foreign countries.281 The next section will
examine the economic interests that form a framework for determining which
"offers" should be deemed infringing.
B. Economic Interests Impacted by "Offers to Sell"
The economic benefits conferred upon a patentee by the exclusive right
to offer a patented invention for sale are somewhat different than the benefits
conferred by the other exclusive rights.282 Patentees typically derive
economic benefit from the other exclusive rights-making, using, selling,
and importing 283-when the invention is utilized, either by the patentee, a
licensee, or a customer.284 Regarding "offering to sell," the patentee also
derives economic benefit from placing the concept of the patented product
into the marketplace through the offer.285 In the following sections, the
economic benefits flowing from "offers to sell" will be examined, first in the
circumstance when actual sales occur, and second when no sales are
consummated.
1. When Actual Sales Occur
A patentee's economic interest in a patent may be misappropriated by a
competitor's offer to sell the patented invention when actual sales occur. The
nature and value of the interest taken can be illustrated by examining three
scenarios: 1) actual infringing sales; 2) non-infringing sales; and 3) collateral
sales. The first scenario warrants little discussion.286 When a competitor
usurps the patentee's exclusive right to "offer for sale" and then proceeds to
281 See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759 (noting that preventing infringement in foreign
countries requires "obtaining and enforcing foreign patents").
282 Some "courts seem to believe that there is little actual harm from a mere offer to
sell." Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 789. However, as Judge Rader has
observed "offers to sell ... are real acts with actual consequences." Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan
Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring) (characterizing
§ 271(a) as the traditional understanding of patent law infringement).
283 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
284 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 804 (noting that unlike other
forms of infringement, offering to sell does not require a completed physical embodiment
of the invention to infringe a patent); see also Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1252-53 n.2 (fimding
"one may not be held liable under § 271(a) for 'making' or 'selling' less than a complete
invention").
285 See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
286 The exclusive right to "sell" a patented invention has existed since Congress first
established the patent laws. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112, at § 1
(granting patentee exclusive right of "vending," i.e. selling, the patented invention).
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transact an infringing "sale," the patentee has lost the profit from that sale.287
In these circumstances, there is no significant difference between the
patentee's interest in offering for sale and actually selling the patented
invention.
The second scenario differs from the first in that, although the competitor
offers to sell the patented invention, the resulting sale is actually non-
infringing.288 A sale may be noninfringing because the product sold was not
the patented invention or because the sale did not occur during the term of
the patent or within the United States.289 The patentee's interest affected in
this scenario does not stem directly from the sale that occurred.290 What the
patentee has lost is the opportunity to sell the patented invention to that
customer. 291 The value of this lost opportunity also includes the loss of other
potential customers drawn to the competitor that is offering to sell the
patented invention.292 Regardless of the reason that the sale is non-infringing,
287 Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Markey articulated the
four-part test for a patent holder to recover lost profits:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove: (1)
demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand,
and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
288 This scenario is based upon a "bait and switch technique" suggested by Professor
Holbrook. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 795 n.273.
289 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("[W]hoever without authority... sells any patented
invention, within the United States... infringes the patent").
290 The patentee would almost certainly have an economic interest in the non-
infringing sale, but a patent provides no protection against non-infringing activity.
Although pure economic interests often extend beyond the reach of economic interests
protected by the law, this analysis will focus only upon the latter.
291 Analyzing the economic impact of "offer to sell" infringement in a market with
non-infringing substitutes, Professor Holbrook notes:
A possible harm could be a "bait and switch" technique, in which an infringer offers
to sell an embodiment of the invention, then switches to a lower priced, non-
infringing substitute later.... The patentee in theory has lost a sale due to the
infringing offer, while what is eventually sold would not infringe.
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 795 n.273.
292 In some instances, a competitor engaged in bait and switch tactics may even run
afoul of the federal statutes prohibiting unfair methods of competition. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Regulations under these statutes define "bait advertising" as a form
of unfair competition, the primary purpose of which is "to obtain leads as to persons
interested in buying merchandise of the type so advertised." 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2008).
Although the primary focus of these regulations is protecting consumers, the ability to
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the competitor has used an offer to sell a patented invention to generate
interest in a competing product to the commercial detriment of the
patentee. 293
Finally, offering to sell the patented invention may lead to collateral or
convoyed sales in which the patentee has an interest.294 When a patentee
offers to sell and sells a patented invention, courts have recognized the
patentee may also derive benefit from sales of related items. 295 Courts have
recognized this interest by allowing sales of related, but unpatented, products
to be considered in determining damages for patent infringement. 296 When a
competitor offers to sell the patented invention, the competitor is likely to
also deprive the patentee of these collateral sales.297 Thus, the patentee's
economic interest in offering to sell the patented invention encompasses not
only infringing and non-infringing sales, but also any collateral sales which
may follow. 298
2. When No Sales Occur
Even if a competitor does not complete any sales of infringing, non-
infringing, or collateral products, a competing "offer to sell" may still harm
use offers of a patented invention to identify potential customers is an benefit that the
potential infringer has taken from the patentee.
293 See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 n.4.
294 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). The valid interest in collateral or
convoyed sales should not be confused with the improper tying of unpatented articles
constituting patent misuse. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 30-31 (1931).
295 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
296 The sixth factor for determining a reasonable royalty encompasses: "The effect
of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the
existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented
items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales." Id. Similarly, courts permit
consideration of sales of non-patented products when damages are calculated based on
lost profits. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (affirming award of lost profits "for lost sales of a device not covered by the
patent in suit").
297 See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(affirming an increased reasonable royalty because sales of the infringing product "would
promote sales of the [infringer's] other products").
298 Consideration of all the potential economic interests is appropriate because
"[t]he normal practice of exploitation by patent owners, as with owners of any other
intellectual property right, is to exclude all forms of competition that could detract
significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent's grant of market
exclusivity." Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R, 161 (March 17, 2000).
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the patentee's economic interests. 299 Courts and commentators alike have
identified interests belonging to the patentee that may be impaired by
competing "offers to sell," regardless of whether the competitor completes
any actual sales. Professor Holbrook identifies the first of these interests as
price erosion caused by competing offers.300 A patentee selling an invention
into a market without acceptable non-infringing substitutes may typically
command a premium price for the patented good.301 The ability to collect
this premium however depends upon maintaining the exclusivity afforded by
the patent grant.302 When a competitor offers to sell the patented invention,
the appearance of exclusivity vanishes and price erosion may occur, even
before a sale is consummated. 30 3 Moreover, the effect of pre-sale price
erosion was recognized as a real injury even before "offers to sell"
infringement because available, 30 4 supporting the conclusion that "[p]rice
erosion can result from competitor activity that falls short of a formal
commercial offer."305
The second interest impacted by a competing offer is in reality a
combination of interests stemming from other ways in which patentees
extract economic value from their inventions. As the Federal Circuit noted,
the purpose of offer to sell infringement is not to protect actual sales, but to
prevent competitors from "generating interest" that harms the patentee.306 A
brief examination of the ways in which offers may generate interest reveals
299 See generally Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 788-98.
300 Id. at 791 (observing that "[p]rice erosion has long been recognized as a type of
patent infringement damage").
301 Id. at 792 ("A patent may provide the patentee with market power sufficient to
allow the patentee to charge a price higher than the competitive price .... ).
302 See Robert S. Frank, Jr. & Denise W. DeFranco, Patent Infringement Damages:
A Brief Summary, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 281, 287-88 (2000).
303 Professor Holbrook explains this phenomenon:
An offer to sell alone, however, could cause price erosion.... Forced price
reduction can occur before the infringer has made a sale, for example, by simply
announcing future market entry. A patentee may also have to forgo any future price
increase due to the infringer's entry into the market, which would also be a
compensable form of price erosion. A completed sale, however, would not be
required for the depressive effect on price to occur.
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 792 (internal citations omitted).
304 Id. at 793. The Federal Circuit permitted the patentee to recover damages based
on "losses incurred upon announcement by [the infringer] of the infringing activity ...
when the losses are found to be reasonably related to the infringing activity." Brooktree
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
305 Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 798.
306 See 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379.
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that patent holders derive many commercial benefits when neither the
patentee nor the competitor complete an actual sale.307
Most generally, the exclusive right to offer the patented invention for
sale benefits the reputation of the patent holder in both commercial and
capital markets. In the commercial market, the patentee may employ "offers
to sell" to advertise the patentee's products and business. 308 The patentee's
interest in utilizing offers to sell for advertising purposes is also recognized
outside the United States.309 Additionally, associating a business with a
patented invention may generate good will in much the same manner as a
trademark.310 Patentees also have an interest in bolstering the reputation of
their businesses. 311 While the patent grant itself provides one signal of a
business's capability, the absence of competing offers to sell the patented
invention may support an inference that the patent owner possesses unique
and valuable assets. 312 This may in turn lead to increased licensing
opportunities for the patent holder. 313
307 An offer-generating interest that leads to actual sales or price erosion-
produces the most tangible economic impacts on the patentee and are equally relevant to
this discussion; however because those offers and impacts were previously addressed
they will not be revisited here. See supra notes 287-99 and accompanying text.
308 See Everett Assoc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 874, 884 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (holding that advertising injury provisions of insurance policy may cover
claims of patent infringement). The Everett court construed "offers to sell" infringement
as encompassing "advertising a patented product." Id. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit
narrowed the construction to traditional commercial offers. Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1254-55.
However, the Everett court's discussion of how offers to sell may constitute advertising
injury is still informative. Although "offering" may not be as broad as "advertising," even
a traditional commercial offer provides some advertising benefit.
309 See Gerber Garment Tech. Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd, [1995] 13 R.P.C. 383, 411-12
(United Kingdom Patents Court) (noting a patentee may be harmed by mere advertising
activities).
3 10 See Chisum, supra note 15, at 609 n.29 (noting "although its primary purpose is
to reduce consumer confusion, trademark law increasingly protects a trademark owner's
good-will").
311 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 646 (2002) (arguing
that patents signal the strength of a firm's R&D capacity and human capital, and attract
licensing opportunities).
312 See Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation,
16 RAND J. ECON. 237, 238 (1985) (noting that protecting property rights opens markets
for trading in technological information); see also Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs
Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 475 (2005) (reviewing alternative views of
the interests patents may serve).
313 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 790 n.242 ("Affording an
exclusive right over mere offers to sell may indirectly benefit the non-utilizing patentee if
the patentee intends to eventually license the patent.... The earlier availability of
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The variety of economic interests impacted by competing "offers to sell"
are likely to increase as patent holders seek new ways to extract value from
their intellectual property. 314 The economic interests previously discussed,
however, share the common trait of being negatively affected by competing
offers to sell, emphasizing that real harm flows from this form of
infringement. 315
C. Economic Interests Provide a Coherent Framework for Defining
Liability
This Note has explored the unsettled question of whether "offers to sell"
patent infringement should be construed to cover sales contemplated outside
the United States. Arguments based upon territoriality principles were
reviewed and ultimately found to provide an insufficient framework for
answering this question. This section will analyze the four permutations of
"offers to sell" infringement in light of the patentee's economic interests just
discussed, and conclude that offers made within the United States should
constitute patent infringement regardless of the location of any contemplated
sale.
The first permutation comprising a domestic offer resulting in a domestic
sale of the patented invention violates all of the patentee's economic interests
previously discussed. Courts are unanimous in holding that this activity
constitutes infringement of the exclusive rights for both "offering to sell" and
"selling." 316 The second permutation is also uniformly held to infringe-a
domestic offer contemplating a domestic sale that does not result in an
injunctive relief may allow the inventor to obtain the license more quickly than under the
pre-TRIPS statute.").
314 Some commentators have suggested that the narrow construction of "offer"
adopted in Rotec fails to adequately protect the economic interests of patent holders and,
therefore, patent holders may increasingly look to less traditional means of extracting
value from their patents. See, e.g., Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 798
(arguing "[a]n expansive view of 'offers to sell' would more appropriately protect the
patentee's interests"); Zelson, supra note 12, at 1302 (noting "narrow contractual
meaning of 'offer' is inadequate to protect the economic rights of a patentee in her
invention").
315 As Judge Rader noted: "Commercial... offers for sale ... are not legal fictions,
but rather are genuine economic acts that.., operate under the commercial laws of a
forum state or target its markets and residents." Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173
F.3d 829, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring).
316 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). This conclusion is unsurprising because "selling"
alone has long been sufficient to find infringement. See supra note 286.
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infringing sale.317 This form of "offers to sell" infringement violates all of
the patentee's economic interests previously discussed, except for the interest
in actual sales of the patented invention.318 The extent of the injury suffered
by the patentee will depend upon the reasons why a domestic infringing sale
is not completed. If there is a non-infringing alternative, the competitor has
misappropriated the patentee's right to offer the patented product to that
customer.319 If the competitor makes no sales as a result of the infringing
"offer," then the patentee's loss would be limited to price erosion and the
impact on the patentee's reputation.320 Because the economic impact of these
first two permutations result in comparable economic harm, it is logical that
both have been accepted as patent infringement. 321
Analyzing the third and forth permutations-domestic offers for
contemplated or actual foreign sales-reveals the benefit of focusing upon
economic interests rather than geography.322 The nature of the economic
harm to the patentee is the same for offers contemplating foreign sales as for
offers contemplating domestic sales, although the extent of that harm may be
lessened. Under either scenario, the competitor is offering the patented
317 A caveat to this general rule requires the sale to also be contemplated prior to
expiration of the patent, but the exception does not impact this analysis. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(i) (2006).
318 The interest in "actual sales" would be more properly attributed to the exclusive
right to "sell" rather than to "offer for sale." See supra notes 289-94 and accompanying
text.
3 19 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 795 n.273 (discussing bait and
switch).
320 Even if the competitor's offer disclaims all sales until after the patent has
expired, by invoking the protection of § 271(i), the competing offer will still operate to
the commercial detriment of the patentee. See Garlepp, supra note 150, at 318 (observing
that even a "disclaimed offer may provide commercial advantage to the advertiser in the
form of name recognition or stockpiling orders").
321 Regarding price erosion, the addition of offer to sell infringement aligned
liability with economic impact, eliminating a perceived inconsistency in the patent law:
Prior to the amendment of the patent laws to include infringement for offers to sell,
recovery for pre-sale price erosion was contingent upon a subsequently completed
sale, even though the patentee was pecuniarily harmed by the mere announcement of
entry into the market by a competitor.... Infringement for offers to sell an invention
eliminates this discrepancy in the patent law by affording recovery for this harm in
the absence of a completed sale.
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 793.
322 For a discussion of the anomalies created by a territoriality-based analysis, see
supra Part V.D.
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invention to capture benefits that might otherwise accrue to the patentee. 323
For example, price erosion in the patentee's domestic market would still
occur.324 Similarly, the patentee's reputation interests would be harmed by
the competing offers regardless of where a sale is contemplated.325 The
injury is suffered by the patentee at the location of the offending offer.326
Although the nature of the economic interests is the same, the value of
the interests may be affected by the location of the contemplated sale. For
example, price erosion in the domestic market would be less severe if the
competing offers were confined to contemplated foreign sales.327 Similarly,
some domestic patent holders may not be able to supply non-infringing or
collateral products to foreign customers and therefore would have little
interest in those opportunities. In contrast, the extent of the harm to
reputation interests is less likely to be affected by the location of a
contemplated sale. In the context of trademark infringement, Professor
Chisum has observed: "Good-will by its nature can be damaged by
inappropriate conduct wherever it occurs. ' 328 Measuring the extent of the
impact, however, is a factual question that will require the evaluation of
numerous factors, only one of which would be the location of the
contemplated sale.
Given the common economic interests affected, offers for both
contemplated domestic and foreign sales should give rise to infringement
323 Some of the benefits previously discussed include generating name recognition,
stockpiling orders, creating good will, signaling R&D capability, and attracting licensing
opportunities.
324 Domestic price erosion would be likely for at least two reasons. First, knowledge
of competitors capable of supplying the same product would reduce the perception that
the patentee is the only source of the good. Second, competing domestic offers will cause
some domestic demand to shift overseas to the extent the technology and consumers are
capable of utilizing the invention in foreign countries.
325 In a global marketplace, building name recognition and signaling institutional
capability to capital markets are transnational benefits. See supra note 312.
326 See North Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (finding "the 'tort' of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is
committed") (emphasis added).
327 Economic theory would suggest the price difference between the domestic and
foreign sales would relate to the added cost of utilizing the invention in the foreign
country. For some technologies, this additional cost is negligible and the competitor
would be effectively competing with the patentee's domestic market thus depriving the
patentee of exclusivity and resulting financial benefits. See Wasserman, supra note 252,
at 281 ("[T]echnology is not contained easily within national borders. In particular,
networking technology allows one to reap the benefits of a patented invention within the
United States but practice all or part of the invention outside of its borders.").
328 Chisum, supra note 15, at 609 n.29 (suggesting that the interests protected by
trademark, e.g. good-will, justify the extraterritorial application of trademark law).
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liability. Distinguishing these permutations of "offer to sell" would create an
unjustified asymmetry in the patent law, ignoring the common impact each
has on the patent holder.329 Further, discounting any economic interest the
United States patent holder may have in the actual foreign sale of the
patented invention, 330 the final permutation of "offer to sell" becomes
redundant with the third. Because identical economic interests are affected,
liability should therefore attach to domestic offers resulting in foreign
sales. 331
Under this framework, infringement liability should attach to offers made
within the United States to sell a patented invention regardless of where the
sale is contemplated. By construing "offers to sell" infringement to
encompass the broad scope of potential injury a patentee may suffer, liability
may be established and courts may then fashion a remedy proportional to the
extent of the actual injury.332
D. Unresolved Issue-Remedy
One issue that has received little attention from both courts and
commentators is the appropriate remedy for infringing "offers to sell. 333
This lack of focus likely results from the continuing debate over the Federal
Circuit's construction of what constitutes an "offer." 334 Until the scope of
liability is established, speculation about proper remedies may be premature.
Detailed analysis of the proper remedy is beyond the scope of this Note;
however, a few points are worth highlighting.
Remedies awarded for patent infringement typically include injunctions,
damages, or both. For offer to sell infringement, injunctions prohibiting any
329 Such a distinction would also ignore Judge Rader's statement that offers to sell
are "real acts" with "actual consequences." See Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173
F.3d 829, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring)
330 Absent a revolution in international patent law, foreign sales will remain beyond
the scope of the economic interests protected by a United States patent. But see Chisum,
supra note 15, at 616 (noting that "growing concern over the cost of multinational
intellectual property rights procurement and enforcement ... will make territorialism an
unacceptable obstacle to international trade").
331 Liability however would only be proper under the "offers to sell" language of
§ 271(a). See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
332 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (providing remedies for patent infringement in the form of
injunctions and damages).
333 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 791 (proposing price erosion as
one measure of damages).
334 See generally Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 15 (analyzing territorial
limitations of "offer to sell" infringement); Zelson, supra note 12 (analyzing scope of
activities constituting an offer).
[Vol. 70:2
CONSTRUING PATENT INFRINGEMENT
further offers and any contemplated sales are likely to be the most common.
Given the similar interests protected, enjoining infringing offers would be
consistent with the customary practice of issuing injunctions for trademark
infringement. 335 Courts may also enjoin contemplated domestic sales;
however, United States' courts should not attempt to enjoin contemplated
foreign sales.336 In fact, a reluctance to enjoin foreign manufacturing activity
may explain the result reached in the first district court to hold domestic
offers for foreign sales could not infringe a United States patent.337
Under certain circumstances, infringing offers to sell may warrant the
award of monetary damages. The patent statute states "the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer .... ,338 Some injuries, such as price erosion, may be amenable to
traditional damage calculations, in which case there is little difficulty.339 A
damage calculation for an infringing offer, however, should not include the
lost profits or a reasonable royalty on non-infringing sales. 340 One
commentator has argued that the reasonable royalty mandated by the statute
as a minimum recovery overcompensates the patentee. 341 Reasonable royalty
damages are typically calculated by multiplying a royalty percentage by
335 See Chisum, supra note 15, at 609 (noting an injunction is the usual remedy for
trademark infringement).
336 Cf Taria Mundiya, Extraterritorial Injunctions Against Sovereign Litigants in
US. Courts: The Need for a Per Se Rule, 44 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 893 (1995) (focusing on
United States courts enjoining prosecution of claims in foreign courts that would deprive
the domestic court of jurisdiction over the matter; noting that such injunction should be
used sparingly if at all). Additionally, the standards by which courts consider requests to
enjoin foreign conduct require further consideration. See, e.g., Laura Eddleman Heim,
Note, Protecting Their Own?: Pro-American Bias and the Issuance of Anti-Suit
Injunctions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 701, 741 (2008) ("If the United States hopes to thrive in an
integrated, globalized economy, giving due respect to foreign jurisdictions and careful
consideration to foreign litigants is essential.").
337 See Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 613,
619 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting the patentee asked the court to enjoin manufacturing in
Scotland).
338 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (emphasis added).
339 See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 793-94 (observing that while
price erosion damages are often warranted, patentees rarely claim this element of
damages).
340 The Microsoft Court rejected AT & T's argument that a single domestic act
could trigger liability for multiple foreign acts of copying. See Microsoft Corp. v.
AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1746-59 (2007). Similarly, the Court would likely find
that damages for an infringing offer could not extend to the actual lost profits from non-
infringing sales.
341 Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 11, at 797.
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some measure of the infringer's sales revenue. 342 Unlike traditional forms of
infringement, the patentee's injury from infringing offers may not be
proportional to the infringer's sales.343 As a result, offer to sell infringement
may require a reconsideration of the traditional measure of patent
infringement damages.
VII. CONCLUSION
Construing "offers to sell" infringement is a difficult problem. The
legislative history reveals this form of infringement originated from attempts
to harmonize international patent law, but reveals little about the proper
scope of this exclusive right.344 Over the past decade, the Federal Circuit has
had limited opportunities to provide guidance. 345 Left to find their own way,
the few district courts to address this issue have split into two camps,
adopting conflicting interpretations. 346 The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Microsoft Corp. v. AT& T Corp. emphasized the presumption against
extraterritorial application of United States patent law, and influenced one
district court to limit the scope of "offers to sell" infringement. 347 Whether
the effect of Microsoft will become more widespread is uncertain.
Nevertheless, territoriality principles appear to be insufficient for resolving
this question. 348 An alternative analysis focused upon the patentee's
economic interests provides a coherent framework for shaping liability, while
avoiding the inconsistencies of a territoriality-based construction. This Note
concludes that in order to protect the economic interests of the patentee,
infringing "offers to sell" should be construed to encompass all offers made
within the United States regardless of where the contemplated sale of the
patented invention will occur.349
The issue of whether "offers to sell" infringement encompasses an offer
made in the United States to sell a patented invention in a foreign country is
unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Exclusive rights inherently create
conflict between the party who owns the right and those seeking to exploit
the patented invention. Ultimately, however, a choice must be made to define
342 See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1141
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
343 As discussed supra Part VI.B, the patentee may be injured even if the infringer
does not transact any sales as a result of the infringing offer.
344 See supra Part II.
345 See supra Part III.
34 6 See supra Part IV.
34 7 See supra Part IV.C.
3 4 8 See supra Part V.D.
3 49 See supra Part VI.C.
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the scope of a patentee's exclusive right. That choice will require weighing
the competing legal and policy arguments and deciding which interests are
most deserving of protection. As competition and conflict in global markets
increase, the Federal Circuit will eventually be compelled to decide this
issue. Given the significance of the policies implicated in this debate, review
by the Supreme Court would not be surprising, especially given the Court's
apparently renewed interest in patent law. However, as history shows, even a
determination by the Supreme Court is subject to review by Congress-the
one participant who until now has been conspicuously silent on this issue.

